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I. Introduction
This Study, the eleventh in a series,' tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 1995
Term.2 The analysis is designed to determine whether an individual
Justice, as well as the Court as a whole, is voting more "conserva-
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this Study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the
Study in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 1 (1992) [herein-
after 1991 Study]. The last two Studies, analyzing the 1993 and 1994 Terms, were both
published in the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly. See Richard G. Wilkins et al.,
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [herein-
after 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 study].
2. The 1995 Term covers decisions made from October 1995 to July 1996.
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tively," more "liberally," or about the same as compared with past
terms. As in politics, whether or not a judicial trend is "conservative"
or "liberal" often lies in the eye of the beholder. A lawyer for the
American Civil Liberties Union could well paint an ideological picture
of the Court far different from one sketched by a lawyer for Ameri-
cans United For Life.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to defined categories of
cases across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an asser-
tion of governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor
a claim of individual liberty.3 By tracking the term-to-term conserva-
tive or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual Justices and
the Court as a whole across ten defined categories of cases,4 and by
applying standard statistical tests to the resulting data,5 the Study at-
tempts to provide reliable information regarding the current ideologi-
cal posture of the Court and its members, as well as conclusions and
predictions regarding its past and future trends. Whether any statisti-
cal study of a process as complex as judicial decision-making can be
reliable is, of course, open to debate.6 But, within the limitations in-
herent in an attempt to number-crunch ideology, this annual survey
can still offer students and practitioners information useful for assess-
ing how an individual Justice, or the Court as a whole, will vote in
particular types of cases.
This Terms's survey reveals a Court in ideological tension.
Although some measures suggest a growing, or at least continued,
conservatism on the High Bench, there are several contrary liberal
indicators as well. The Court was less conservative in its approach to
state criminal cases than in the recent past,7 and was also more recep-
tive of arguments expanding federal jurisdiction.8 First Amendment
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RwF, DiCriONARY OF MODERN POLrMCAL IDEOLOGmS 67-73, 141-52 (1987) (dis-
cussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions, however,
are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that conservatism "im-
plies fear of sudden and violent changes, respect for established institutions and rulers,
support for elites and hierarchies, and a general mistrust of theory as opposed to empirical
deductions"); id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth-century" liberalism is "compounded of
constitutionalism; doubtful[ ] of pluralism; certain[ ] of a belief in the virtues of economic
freedom, and less certain[ ] of a desire to restrict government intervention in most other
aspects of life").
4. See infra Tables 1-10.
5. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part IV.A.3 and Table 3.
8. See infra Part IV.A.8 and Table 8.
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protections remain strong,9 and equal protection claims are also mak-
ing something of a comeback-although the precise contours (and
content) of this resurgence are unclear.' 0 These liberal indicators,
however, are offset by the fact that the 1995 Court was decidedly
more likely to vote in favor of the federal government in both civil"
and criminal' 2 cases and remains skeptical of statutory civil rights
claims.' 3 Furthermore, the uneasy hegemony of conservative coali-
tions over liberal coalitions in important swing vote decisions suggests
that the replacement of even a single Justice on the Court could have
a significant impact on future ideological trends-an issue of some im-
portance during a presidential election year.' 4 This and other infor-
mation detailed below may be useful in predicting the Court's future
course.
The Study has been slightly restructured this year to make it
more user-friendly than in past years. The precise details of the statis-
tical analysis-as can be gleaned from a glance at the equations and
explanations contained in Appendix B-are hardly the stuff of light
cocktail conversations. However, one need not have an advanced de-
gree in mathematics to understand the general voting trends that flow
from the Study's analysis. Accordingly, the Study is now separated
into distinct segments designed to meet the needs of the reader who
simply wants the gist of identifiable ideological trends as well as the
reader who wants to probe the details of our statistical examinations.
Part II gives a description of the statistical mode of analysis em-
ployed. Part III follows with a general overview of the Study's find-
ings. Part IV then sets out the Study's tables and figures and discusses
the information contained in each. Finally, Appendices A and B de-
tail the definitions and statistical tests that govern the Study. This ap-
proach is designed neither to choke the mathematically challenged
nor to starve statistical savants.
H. Mode of Analysis
The following information is drawn from a tabulation and mathe-
matical analysis of each Justice's votes in ten categories of cases. Nine
of these categories are based on the nature of the issue (e.g., First
9. See infra Part IV.A.5 and Table 5.
10. See infra Part IV.A.6 and Table 6.
11. See infra Part IV.A.2 and Table 2.
12. See infra Part IV.A.4 and Table 4.
13. See infra Part IV.A.7 and Table 7.
14. See infra Part IV.A.10 and Table 10.
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Amendment, equal protection) or on the character of the parties (e.g.,
state government against a private party).' 5 The tenth category tabu-
lates the number of times each Justice voted with the majority in cases
decided by a single, or swing, vote.
16
These categories are designed to demonstrate each Justice's atti-
tude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court deci-
sion-making: protection of individual rights and judicial restraint.
The tabulation of votes in each category reveals, in broad strokes, the
frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
vote to protect individual rights17 or to exercise judicial restraint.'"
From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative" or
"liberal" positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an asser-
15. The categories are as follows:
1) Civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials or political subdivi-
sions, is opposed by a private party.
2) Civil controversies in which the federal government, or one of its agencies or
officials, is opposed by a private party.
3) State criminal cases.
4) Federal criminal cases.
5) First Amendment issues (freedoms of speech, press, association and free exer-
cise of religion).
6) Equal protection claims.
7) Statutory civil rights claims.
8) Issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and related
matters.
9) Federalism cases.
16. See infra note 46.
17. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome of
state and federal criminal cases (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the resolution of
claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause (Table 6),
and statutory civil rights (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Tables 1 and 2 also involve
individual rights, since these suits pit the government against persons asserting private
rights. The federalism cases tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to individual
rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state authority. Never-
theless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to deny federal relief to a
party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights.
18. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the Jus-
tices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of judicial
restraint. Other tables included in the Study, however, also provide some indication of the
individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the judicial restraint/judicial activism
axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to the policy-making branches
of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of constitutional bases of decision when
narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers' intent when construing constitutional text,
and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, polit-
ical questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor of individual rights claims (Tables 3, 4, 5, 6,
7) may indicate judicial activism because judicial recognition of individual rights often re-
quires the Court to overturn precedent or to invalidate an existing statute. Federalism
cases (Table 9) are also relevant because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with
respect for the role of the states within the federal system.
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tion of governmental power as conservative, and outcomes that favor
a claim of individual right as liberal.19 Accordingly, the Study classi-
fies as conservative a vote for the government against an individual, a
vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against
the exercise of jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state (as opposed to
federal) authority on federalism questions. The Study classifies as lib-
eral all contrary votes.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions (a sig-
nificant portion of all cases decided by the Court) are included in the
Study's calculations even though liberal or conservative ideology as
such may not have influenced the outcome of those cases. When an
opinion is unanimous, it is often true that the law or the facts, or both,
pointed so clearly in one direction that ideology was not a decisional
factor. Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not always, or
even necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial restraint.20 This
Term, for example, the dissenters in Shaw v. Hunt2' and Bush v. Vera 2
asserted that the Court's acceptance of an equal protection-based
challenge to the racial composition of voting districts, rather than evi-
dencing a regard for individual rights, was an example of improper
judicial activism.23 In other cases, particular circumstances may result
in a reversal in the expected relationship.24
Despite such difficulties, the basic assumption that supports this
Study-that the general orientation of individual Justices and the
Court to individual rights and judicial restraint is suggestive of con-
servative or liberal ideology-appears sound. For example, deference
to legislatures frequently results in rejection of an individual's claim,
19. We are mindful of the limited validity of the "conservative" and "liberal" labels.
See supra note 3.
20. For example, if existing precedent grants extensive protection to individual rights,
a Justice who resists efforts to undermine that precedent (a conservative trait) is exercising
restraint and also acting to preserve individual rights (a liberal result).
21. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
22. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
23. See Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1907; Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1993.
24. For example, see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996), where Justice
Stevens conservatively voted against a claim of federal preemption. This vote, however,
may not be indicative of the Justice's actual ideology. In Medtronic, the issue was whether
state tort claims were preempted by federal regulation of the safety of medical appliances.
In such circumstances, Justice Stevens's rejection of the preemption claim results in in-
creased regulation (i.e., by both state and federal governments) of the medical appliances
industry-an outcome that could be characterized as favoring the prerogatives of individ-
ual consumers. Therefore, Justice Stevens's somewhat uncharacteristic vote in favor of
state power in Medtronic may indicate not conservative leanings, but rather a general lib-
eral tendency to protect individual rights through increased regulation.
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especially one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental ac-
tion.' Judicial restraint, which emphasizes the Framers' original in-
tent, is also evident in the Court's reluctance to read new rights into
the Constitution.2 6 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the
matter to state courts and their possible bias in favor of state actions
against individuals, and such a refusal is a clear rebuff to the claimant
seeking federal protection of rights.27 Therefore, to the extent that
the Study's basic ideological assumptions regarding liberal and con-
servative outcomes are accurate, it is possible to identify trends by
tracking the voting patterns reflected in Tables 1 through 10.
To reckon current ideological positions within the Court, votes of
individual Justices can be compared with those cast by other Justices
this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1988 through 1994
Terms.28 Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court as a
whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes for the
Court majority to those of prior terms. In the various tables, this in-
formation appears in the form of percentages for each Justice, as well
as for the Court majority.29 Figures 1 through 10, in turn, graphically
demonstrate the voting trends revealed in the tables.
Finally, Regression Tables 1 through 10 analyze the voting pat-
terns of the five Justices who have been on the Court since 1988:
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia, O'Connor, and
Kennedy. The remaining Justices have not been on the Court long
enough to perform a reliable regression analysis.3 0 The purpose of the
Regression Tables is to determine whether any changes in voting pat-
terns by the analyzed Justices are statistically significant, whether a
Justice's current voting pattern departs substantially from his or her
prior voting behavior, and whether there is any correlation among the
voting patterns of the analyzed Justices.31
25. See, eg., Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (rejecting individual challenge
to forfeiture statute).
26. See, eg., Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996) (refusing to imply
private right of contribution under federal statute).
27. See, eg., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (rejecting, on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, plaintiff's challenge to Florida's assertion of regulatory power).
28. Although the Study began with the 1986 Term, the tables are limited to data for
the past eight terms. Because of the changes in Court personnel over time, to include more
than seven prior terms on the tables would prove somewhat cumbersome. Furthermore,
comparative analysis of the eight terms in the tables should be more than adequate to
gauge the ideological fluctuations on the Court.
29. This is not true for Table 10, which analyzes the Court's swing voting.
30. See infra Appendix B.
31. For a more detailed explanation, see infra text accompanying notes 99-107 and
Appendix B.
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All of this data must be interpreted with caution. The percent-
ages and statistical results revealed on each table are affected not only
by the behavior of the individual Justices, but also by the nature of the
cases decided in a given term. The significant increase in the 1995
Court's receptivity of the federal government's claims on Tables 2 and
4, for example, may not indicate growing conservatism as much as in-
creasing care and selectivity exercised by the federal government in
pressing only meritorious claims upon the Court.32 Furthermore,
Supreme Court cases are not the result of random selection, and the
universe of votes cast by any particular Justice is relatively small.
Since both random sampling and large sample size are crucial ele-
ments of any fully reliable statistical analysis, conclusions drawn from
this Study are not beyond dispute. There are, of course, obvious limi-
tations in any empirical analysis of a subjective decision-making
process.
33
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth either conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years, exper-
ienced Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to predetermine
the ideological predilections of individual Justices in framing their ar-
guments to the Court. Moreover, both the media and academics are
fond of attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel.
32. The federal government did not fare well before the Court during the early years
of the Clinton Administration. See 1994 Study, supra note 1, at 31-32; 1993 Study, supra
note 1, at 283. This Term's significantly improved batting average for the Administration
may flow not from growing conservatism on the part of the Court, but from the Solicitor
General's increased experience in selecting winners to present to the Court. A significant
portion of the federal civil cases tabulated on Table 2, for example, were unanimous or
nearly unanimous decisions in favor of federal regulatory authority in the areas of labor
law and taxation. See, eg., NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995)
(unanimous decision in favor of federal government's construction of national labor law);
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 116 S. Ct. 647 (1996) (7-2 decision in favor of
federal government's construction of the Internal Revenue Code); United States v. No-
land, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) (unanimous decision in favor of federal government's construc-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code); Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1754
(1996) (unanimous decision in favor of federal government's construction of national labor
law); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 116 S. Ct.
595 (1996) (same).
33. The general reliability of statistical inference depends upon random sampling. See
ROBERT V. HOGG & ALLEN T. CRAIG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS
157-58 (1959); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN REGRESSION WITH APPLI-
CATIONS 9-11 (1990). This Study is limited to a small universe-the cases in which deci-
sions have been rendered by the entire Court over the period for which data have been
collected. Sample sizes vary from year to year, according to the case selection of the Court.
This Study, then, is subject to sampling bias, both because the sample is not random and
because it is comparatively small. Any statistical inferences, therefore, may not accurately
represent a Justice's (or the Court's) views.
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Consequently, Supreme Court practitioners, legal scholars, and the
public have long assumed that any assessment of Court ideology is
valuable-even when such an assessment may be based on little more
than the gut reactions of the attorneys, scholars, and news reporters
involved. This Study, based upon a systematic methodology for objec-
tively gathering, quantifying, and analyzing data, should be more reli-
able than such ad hoc assessments.
MI. Overview of Ideological Trends of the 1995 Term
The voting patterns that emerge from this year's Study reveal ide-
ological instability on the Court. The data from five of the ten tables
indicate conservative34 ideological movement.35 In contrast, the data
from the other five tables suggest either liberal movement or a reten-
tion of liberal gains attained in the past few terms.36 In sum, although
it is commonplace to assume that the present Court is conservative,
the statistical data do not unambiguously support this popular percep-
tion. Rather, the 1995 data demonstrate that, if anything, the Court is
not heading in any consistent ideological direction.
Table 1, which gauges the ideological outcome of civil cases
where one party is a state government, indicates a slight conservative
movement in favor of governmental litigants. Any such conservative
advance, however, is small and merely checks a liberal trend that be-
gan in 1993. 37 By contrast, the 1995 Court was less receptive of claims
made by state governments in criminal cases; Table 3 demonstrates
liberal, not conservative, movement in state criminal cases, and re-
gression analysis38 shows that the liberal movement by the three gen-
erally conservative jurists (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy) and by a more moderate swing voter (Justice
O'Connor) is statistically significant.39 The Court also seemed to be
less inclined than in the past to defer to the states on the federalism
issues tracked by Table 9. Thus, any distinct ideological trend in
Supreme Court litigation involving the states is hard to discern-the
34. Hereinafter, the terms "conservative" and "liberal" will be used as they were de-
fined supra note 3 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Tables 1 (state civil cases), 2 (federal civil cases), 4 (federal criminal
cases), 7 (statutory civil rights claims) and 10 (swing vote cases).
36. See infra Tables 3 (state criminal cases), 5 (First Amendment claims), 6 (equal
protection claims), 8 (jurisdictional issues), and 9 (federalism cases).
37. See 1993 Study, supra note 1, at 270.
38. See infra Appendix B, subpart 3 for a definition of regression analysis.
39. See infra Regression Table 3.
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Court's possible deference to the states in civil litigation is balanced
by increasing skepticism of the states' criminal and federalism claims.
The same cannot be said, however, regarding the Court's resolu-
tion of federal claims. The 1995 Court was dramatically more recep-
tive of claims made by the federal government than in the recent past.
Table 2, which collects the Court's results in civil cases where the fed-
eral government is a party, shows that the Justices were markedly
more open to arguments made by the federal government in 1995.
Specifically, the government was over 32 percentage points more suc-
cessful in civil cases this Term than last. Table 4 reflects the same
trend in federal criminal cases-most of the Justices voted in favor of
the federal government more often in criminal cases in 1995 than in
recent terms.
Whether the Court's treatment of various substantive claims in-
volving the First Amendment,4 0 the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,4 1 and statutory civil rights claims demon-
strates liberal or conservative movement is open to debate. Table 5
indicates some slight conservative movement in the Court's disposi-
tion of First Amendment cases. Despite this trend, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor produced voting pat-
terns that evidence statistically significant liberal movement.42 Fur-
thermore, the Court's overall acceptance of First Amendment claims
remains historically high. It appears, then, that while the Court is not
currently moving in any clear ideological direction on First Amend-
ment issues, it is maintaining a liberal receptivity to such claims.
Table 6 demonstrates that the Court's treatment of equal protec-
tion claims is more troublesome. Although the Court accepted equal
protection claims pressed by gay rights activists43 and womens'
groups" that virtually everyone would concede to be liberal, it also
entertained claims brought by nonminority voters who claimed that
the racial composition of their recently realigned voting districts vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.45 Since this Study assumes that all
these claims are liberal, Table 6 shows a distinct liberal trend by the
Court on equal protection issues.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. I. First Amendment cases include those that involve a deci-
sion regarding freedom of expression, freedom of association, or the free exercise of
religion.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
42. See infra Regression Table 5.
43. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
44. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (educational gender bias).
45. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
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Table 7, on the other hand, reveals that the Court's stance on
statutory civil rights was conservative no matter how one analyzes the
data. Table 7, Figure 7 and Regression Table 7 all show that (at the
very least) the Court majority continues to view statutory civil rights
claims with suspicion, a trend that began in 1989.
Table 8, which demonstrates the Court's willingness to expand
the jurisdictional reach of the federal courts, shows across-the-board
liberal movement in 1995. Every Justice on the Court was more hos-
pitable to claims of federal jurisdiction than in the past two terms.
Figure 8, in fact, shows that the Court is headed back toward the lib-
eral highs scored from 1989-1991.
Perhaps the most important, although least surprising, statistics
contained in this Study are collected in Table 10. That Table analyzes
the voting influence of the various members of the Court in swing
vote decisions.46 Table 10 reveals (as it has for the past couple of
terms) that the present Court is sharply divided into two ideological
camps: a liberal group composed of Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg and Breyer, and a conservative group composed of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Between these two fac-
tions operate the Court's two moderate swing voters, Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor. These two Justices have tremendous impact.
Their votes often determine the outcome of the most pressing ques-
tions before the Court.47 This Term, as in the past two terms, Justice
Kennedy was the Court's most influential member in close cases. Jus-
tice O'Connor ran a close second.
Whether the power held by these two Justices is good or bad
(either for the Court or the American system of justice) is beyond the
scope of this Study. What can be demonstrated by this analysis, how-
ever, is that the Court's moderate swing voters have caused the Court
46. This category includes five-four decisions, four-three decisions, as well as five-
three and four-two decisions resulting in reversal of a lower court decision. Affirmances by
a vote of five-three or four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the
majority to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a tie vote.
47. Witness, for example, the fractured opinions in Bush v. Vera. There, although a
five-member majority ultimately accepted the plaintiffs' equal protection claims, it did so
on two different rationales. Justice O'Connor, writing for herself, the Chief Justice, and
Justice Kennedy, concluded that, when drawing voting districts, states must not improperly
subordinate relevant districting principles to race. 116 S. Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). The final two votes were supplied by Justices Scalia and Thomas, who would apply
strict scrutiny to such cases. Id. at 1973 (Thomas, J., concurring). Because it is the more
limited rationale, Justice O'Connor's view controls, even though it was supported by only
three votes. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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to vacillate markedly between liberal and conservative outcomes.' s In
1991, the outcome of close cases was usually controlled by a liberal
coalition. In 1992 and 1993, however, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor apparently found conservative views more amenable, and
control shifted to conservative coalitions. In 1994, control again re-
turned to the liberal bloc. And now, in 1995, control has switched
back into conservative hands.
This ideological instability is unlikely to be resolved by future de-
velopments within the Court itself. Rather, the ultimate ideological
direction of the Court will be determined by the outcome of the next
few resignations from, and appointments to, the High Bench. If one
of the conservative or swing vote Justices is replaced with a politically
liberal jurist, the ideological direction of the Court could quickly shift
from the generally conservative (albeit wavering) course of the recent
past. By contrast, because the reliably liberal bloc is presently one
Justice larger than the reliably conservative bloc, it would take two
replacements from the current liberal coalition to produce a similar
conservative shift.
IV. The Voting Record
Subpart A sets out Tables 1-10 and Figures 1-10 and discusses the
trends they reveal. Subpart B then sets out Regression Tables 1-10
and addresses the significance of that data.49
48. See infra Figure 10.
49. The following cases were not included on the Tables because they did not conform
to the definitions governing this Study as set out infra Appendix A:
Netherland v. Tliggle, 116 S. Ct. 4 (1995)
Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995)
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 116 S. Ct. 290 (1995)
Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995)
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996)
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996)
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hiles, 116 S. Ct. 890 (1996)
Bowersox v. Williams, 116 S. Ct. 1312 (1996)
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996)
Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1813 (1996)
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
[Vol. 24.1
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TABLE I
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR GOvERNMENT
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
GOV'T GOV'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Thomas 11 6 64.7 55.0 45.5 41.7 71.4 - - -
Scalia 9 8 52.9 60.0 50.0 41.7 64.3 64.0 64.9 59.2
O'Connor 8 9 47.1 40.0 40.9 50.0 50.0 68.0 67.6 57.4
Rehnqulst 7 9 43.8 60.0 68.2 52.8 71.4 84.0 70.3 66.7
Kennedy 7 10 41.1 40.0 40.9 41.7 42.9 76.0 61.1 57.1
Ginsburg 6 11 35.3 50.0 40.9 - - - - -
Breyer 5 12 29.4 42.1 - - - - -
Sourer 5 12 29.4 35.0 45.5 36.4 52.5 63.6 - -
Stevens 4 13 23.5 42.1 27.3 31.3 29.3 36.0 40.5 35.4
Majority 9 8 52.9 45.0 40.9 41.7 52.4 64.0 51.4 51.0
Split Decisions 8 3 72.7 45.5 46.2 44.4 51.6 68.8 52.4 64.0
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TABLE 2
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR GOVERNMENT
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
GOV'T GOV'T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Ginsburg 17 3 85.0 61.1 58.8 - - - - -
Kennedy 16 4 80.0 47.4 52.9 70.0 76.2 55.6 60.7 66.7
Rnhnquist 15 5' 75.0 52.6 "58.8 74.2 71.4 70.0 78.6 71.4
Souter 15 5 75.0 42.1 76.5 70.0 71.4 55.6 - -
O'Connor 13 7 65.0 27.8 56.3 62.5 52.4 60.0 60.7 60.7
Thomas 13 7 65.0 42.1 47.1 64.5 53.3 - - -
Stevens 12 7 63.2 68.4 70.6 34.4 57.1 40.0 57.1 42.9
Scalia 12 8 60.0 42.1 52.9 67.7 71.4 57.9 60.7 59.3
Breyer 12 8 60.0 47.4 - - - - - -
Maiority 15 5 75.0 42.1 52.9 66.7 81.0 60.0 71.4 64.3
All Cases
Split Decisions 7 4 63.6 33.3 42.8 76.5 83.3 60.0 66.7 66.7
Unanimous 8 1 88.9 57.1 60.0 56.3 77.8 60.0 76.9 61.5
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TABLE 3
STATE CRIMINAL CASES
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR GOVERNMENT
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
GOV'T GOV'T T TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Rehnquist 6 3 66.7 91.7 81.3 90.0 66.7 81.5 85.3 85.2
Thomas 6 3 66.7 91.7 87.5 85.7 75.0 - - -
Kennedy 5 4 55.6 75.0 50.0 77.3 50.0 57.7 73.5 81.5
Scalia 5 4 55.6 83.3 81.3 86.4 77.8 74.1 73.5 77.8
O'Connor 4 5 44.4 58.3 68.8 66.7 33.3 66.7 76.5 77.8
Ginsburg 3 6 33.3 41.7 43.8 - - - -
Souter 2 7 22.2 41.7 25.0 55.0 55.6 68.0 - -
Stevens 2 7 22.2 8.3 25.0 31.8 27.8 0.0 20.6 37.0
Breyer 2 7 22.2 41.7 - - - - - -
Majority 5 4 55.6 58.3 56.3 77.3 44.4 55.6 64.7 70.4
All Cases
Split Decisions 3 1 75.0 60.0 61.5 84.6 33.3 68.2 70.0 72.7
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TABLE 4
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR GOVERNMENT
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
GOV'T GOVT TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Scalia 11 3 78.6 53.9 66.7 62.5 76.9 40.0 66.7 66.7
Souter 11 3 78.6 61.5 58.3 43.8 69.2 75.0 - -
Rehnquist 10 4 71.4 69.2 83.3 81.3 76.9 70.0 77.8 88.0
O'Connor 10 4 71.4 69.2 75.0 75.0 76.9 70.0 77.8 77.8
Thomas 10 4 71.4 61.5 83.3 81.3 54.6 - - -
Kennedy 10 4 71.4 61.5 66.7 60.0 84.6 50.0 66.7 88.9
Breyer 10 4 71.4 69.2 - - - - - -
Ginsburg 10 4 71.4 61.5 58.3 - - - - -
Stevens 7 7 50.0 30.8 50.0 26.7 38.5 60.0 33.3 66.7
Majority 11 3 78.6 53.9 66.7 68.8 69.2 60.0 66.7 88.9
All Cases
Split Decisions 6 1 85.7 55.6 50.0 77.8 55.6 50.0 83.3 100.0











0 > I I I I I
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
MajorityAll Cases ---- SplitDecisions - Unanimous
[Vol. 24:1
SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR
FIGURE 5
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
- M ajority All Cass ---- Split Decisions - Unanimous
TABLE 5
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR RIGTS CLAIM
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
CLAIM CLAIM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Kennedy 7 1 87.5 88.9 71.4 77.8 77.8 41.7 40.0 37.5
Souter 6 2 75.0 77.8 57.1 60.0 88.9 41.7 - -
Breyer 6 2 75.0 66.7 - - - - - -
Ginsburg 6 2 75.0 66.7 71.4 - - - - -
Rehnquist 5 3 62.5 55.6 42.9 36.4 50.0 16.7 13.3 18.8
O'Connor 5 3 62.5 66.7 57.1 36.4 77.8 54.5 26.7 25.0
Stevens 5 3 62.5 66.7 57.1 90.0 100.0 50.0 46.7 64.7
Thomas 3 5 37.5 66.7 85.7 40.0 20.0 - - -
Scalia 3 5 37.5 55.6 85.7 45.5 37.5 25.0 26.7 35.3
Majority 6 2 75.0 77.8 57.1 45.5 66.7 25.0 40.0 35.3
All Cases
Split Decisions 5 2 71.4 83.3 40.0 33.3 57.1 30.0 40.0 22.2
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TABLE 6
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR RIGHTS CLAIM
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
CLAIM CLAIM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Kennedy 4 1 80.0 66.7 100.0 20.0 50.0 42.9 25.0 57.1
O'Connor 4 1 80.0 66.7 100.0 40.0 33.3 28.6 25.0 66.7
Rehnquist 3 2 60.0 66.7 0.0 20.0 50.0 14.3 20.0 57.1
Thomas 2 2 50.0 66.7 0.0 20.0 60.0 - - -
Souter 2 3 40.0 33.3 100.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 - -
Ginsburg 2 3 40.0 33.3 100.0 - - - -
Stevens 2 3 40.0 33.3 100.0 40.0 66.7 83.3 0.0 66.7
Breyer 2 3 40.0 33.3 - - - - - -
Scalia 2 3 40.0 66.7 0.0 20.0 33.3 14.3 25.0 57.1
Majority 4 1 80.0 66.7 100.0 20.0 50.0 42.9 0.0 57.1
All Cases
Split Decisions 4 0 100.0 66.7 100.0 33.3 50.0 50.0 0.0 100.0
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TABLE 7
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR RIGHTS CLAIM
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
CLAIM CLAI TERM TERM TERM TM TERM TERM TERM TEEM
Stevens 5 1 83.3 75.0 55.6 70.0 88.9 80.0 77.8 73.7
Breyer 5 1 83.3 75.0 - - - - -
Ginsburg 4 2 66.7 75.0 44.4 - - - - -
Souter 4 2 66.7 75.0 44.4 45.5 44.4 57.1 - -
O'Connor 2 4 33.3 50.0 33.3 54.6 55.6 53.3 55.6 52.6
Rehnquist 1 5 16.7 50.0 33.3 36.4 44.4 33.3 44.4 35.0
Kennedy 1 5 16.7 25.0 33.3 36.4 55.6 33.3 62.5 45.0
Thomas 1 5 16.7 25.0 33.3 45.5 28.6 - - -
Scalia 1 5 16.7 25.0 33.3 45.5 44.4 46.7 55.6 40.0
Majority 2 4 33.3 50.0 33.3 50.0 55.6 53.3 88.9 50.0
Split Decisions 1 3 25.0 50.0 00.0 50.0 40.0 33.3 83.3 25.0
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TABLE 8
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO THE EERCISE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR JURISDICTION
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
JURIS. JURIS. TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TEEM TERM TERM
Stevens 15 5 75.0 42.1 44.4 69.7 75.0 91.4 68.0 73.0
Souter 13 6 68.4 30.0 33.3 56.3 75.0 57.6 - -
Ginsburg 13 6 68.4 36.8 33.3 - - - -
Breyer 12 7 63.2 33.3 - - - -
Kennedy 12 9 57.1 40.0 33.3 51.5 73.3 58.3 64.0 51.4
O'Connor 10 11 47.6 40.0 22.2 53.1 63.3 51.3 68.0 51.4
Rehnquist 9 12 42.9 30.0 22.2 54.6 62.1 54.3 60.0 51.4
Scalia 9 12 42.9 35.0 22.2 51.5 55.2 48.5 60.0 50.0
Thomas 9 12 42.9 30.0 33.3 54.6 66.7 - - -
Majority 12 9 57.1 40.0 33.3 52.9 73.3 63.9 64.0 62.2
Split Decisions 6 6 50.0 54.6 33.3 37.5 69.2 38.9 33.0 62.5
Unanimous 6 3 66.7 22.2 40.0 66.7 76.5 88.9 81.3 61.9
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TABLE 9
FEDERALLSM CASES
JUSTICE 1995 TERM VOTES % VOTES FOR STATE CLAIM
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
STATE STATE TERSM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Thomas 14 11 56.0 72.2 42.9 66.7 35.0 - - -
Scalia 15 12 55.6 81.3 57.1 60.0 26.1 71.4 56.3 76.2
Kennedy 14 13 51.9 55.6 42.9 60.0 26.1 71.4 56.3 72.7
Rehnquist 14 13 51.9 72.2 71.4 73.3 43.5 71.4 56.3 81.0
O'Connor 12 15 44.4 55.6 57.1 73.3 39.1 71.4 56.3 73.7
Ginsburg 10 16 38.5 50.0 57.1 - - - - -
Souter 9 17 34.6 44.4 57.1 60.0 36.4 83.3 - -
Breyer 9 17 34.6 38.9 - - - - - -
Stevens 8 19 29.6 55.6 57.1 60.0 31.8 28.6 43.8 57.1
Majority 14 13 51.9 55.6 57.1 66.7 26.1 71.4 43.8 59.1
All Cases
Split Decisions 10 6 62.5 36.4 50.0 57.1 28.6 80.0 25.0 50.0
Unanimous 4 7 36.4 85.7 60.0 75.0 22.2 50.0 50.0 70.0
FIGURE 9
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TABLE 10
SWING-VOTE ANALYSIS: WHO VoTES MOST OFrTE WITH TH.E MAJORITY IN CLOSE CASES
JUSTIE 1995 TERM VOTES 9 VOTES FOR GOVENMSNT
FOR AGAINST 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
MAJ. MAY. TERM TEPM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM TERM
Kennedy 17 3 85.0 81.3 92.9 72.7 64.7 52.2 71.4 82.4
O'Connor 16 4 80.0 68.8 57.1 40.9 58.8 69.6 69.0 76.5
Scalia 15 5 75.0 56.3 71.4 81.8 35.3 52.2 66.7 73.5
Thomas 15 5 75.0 50.0 57.1 72.7 23.5 - - -
Rehnquist 15 5 75.0 62.5 71.4 72.7 41.2 69.6 66.7 76.5
Ginsburg 6 14 30.0 50.0 35.7 - - - - -
Souter 6 14 30.0 37.5 42.9 31.8 82.4 59.1 - -
Breyer 5 15 25.0 43.8 - - - - - -
Stevens 5 15 25.0 50.0 35.7 40.9 58.8 47.8 42.9 26.5
Conservative 12 8 60.0 35.7 64.3 63.6 41.2 54.5 64.3 76.5
Outcome








1. Table 1: Civil Cases-State Government Versus a Private Party
Table 150 shows a 7.9 percentage point increase in the Court's
support of state governments in civil cases, resulting in a score of
52.9% in the Majority All Cases category. This moderate result, cou-
pled with that of last Term, appears to have checked the gradual de-
cline in state support noted in our review of the 1993 Term.5' In fact,
1995's score signals some degree of steadiness in the Court's approach
to civil cases involving state governments-an approach that, with the
exception of the 1990 Term, has hovered comfortably around 47.9%
since 1988.
The moderate overall conservative movement this Term, how-
ever, is punctuated by dramatic, offsetting shifts in the Unanimous
and Split Decisions categories. Private litigants prevailed in five of
the six unanimous state civil cases, resulting in an unprecedented low
mark of 16.7% for state governments. This score, a plunge of 27.7
points from 1994, is by far the lowest (and most liberal) ever recorded
since this Study began .5 2 By contrast, the percentage of Split Deci-
sions favoring the states changed in an equally dynamic, but opposite,
fashion. A divided Court decided 72.7% of split civil decisions in
favor of the states, up 27.2 points from the previous Term, and the
most conservative showing recorded in this Study.
5 3
These divergent results are graphed on Figure 1. On the graph,
the upsurge in the Split Decisions category is particularly significant.
A unanimous decision often indicates that the case commanded clear-
50. Cases decided in favor of state government:
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Serv., 116 S. Ct. 1063 (1996)
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996)
Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996)
Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
Cases decided against state government:
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848 (1996)
Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996)
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996)
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996)
Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996)
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996)
Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996)
O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996).
51. See 1993 Study, supra note 1, at 278.
52. The previous low, 33.3%, was achieved in 1993.
53. The next most conservative score was 68.8% in 1990.
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cut results, such that the Justices' individual ideological leanings play a
lesser role. Split decisions, on the other hand, may be a better indica-
tor of individual Justices' (and thus the Court's) true ideological ten-
ets. Accordingly, the fact that the Court this Term favored the states
in nearly three-fourths of split decisions is noteworthy-it validates
and underscores the small conservative shift graphed by the Majority
All Cases line on Figure 1.
A glance at the individual voting records of the different Justices
notably reveals that no one faction of the Court presided over the
conservative turn this Term. Justice Thomas topped the chart, voting
for the government in 64.7% of cases, an increase of 9.7 points from
last Term. Justice Scalia followed with 52.9%.
All of the remaining Justices, however, voted more often than not
against state governments. The scores of three Justices moved signifi-
cantly in a liberal direction this Term.54 Chief Justice Rehnquist plum-
meted from his 1994 perch as the most conservative Justice to take
fourth place. He voted in favor of state governments only 43.8% of
the time, a 16.2 point decrease from 1994 and 9 points below his next
lowest score.55 Justices Stevens and Ginsburg fell 18.6 and 14.7 per-
centage points, respectively, both achieving their most liberal scores. 6
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer favored the states in less than a
third of the civil cases presented to the Court.
2. Table 2: Civil Cases-Federal Government Versus a Private Party
Table 217 confirms that the Court in 1995 was vastly more sup-
portive of federal government claims in civil cases. Indeed, govern-.
54. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Stevens's shifts were statistically sig-
nificant. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
55. In 1992, the Chief Justice scored 52.8%.
56. Justice Stevens's previous low was 27.3% (in 1993), while Justice Ginsburg's was
40.9% (also in 1993, the year she joined the Court).
57. Cases decided in favor of the federal government:
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 116
S. Ct. 595 (1996)
Lawrence v. Chater, 116 S. Ct. 604 (1996)
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 116 S. Ct. 647 (1996)
Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996)
Hercules Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 981 (1996)
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 116 S. Ct. 1091 (1996)
Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996)
United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996)
Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1754 (1996)
Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092 (1996)
United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2106 (1996)
(one issue decided for the federal government, another against)
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ment support jumped well over 30 percentage points in the Majority
All Cases category to reach 75.0%. This surprisingly conservative out-
come appears to signal a rebound by the Court from the decidedly
liberal turns of the past few terms.
5 8
The magnitude of the conservative movement on Table 2 is un-
dercut somewhat by the fact that eight of nine cases decided by a
unanimous Court were decided in favor of the federal government.
As noted previously, unanimously decided cases may not indicate ide-
ological leanings as confidently as split decisions.59 Even discounting
all unanimous cases, though, this Term's outcomes are still strongly
conservative when compared to 1994-support for the federal govern-
ment in the Split Decisions category rose a whopping 30.3 percentage
points in 1995 to reach 63.6%.
The Court's conservatism is further evidenced by the voting be-
havior of the individual Justices. Table 2, especially when considered
together with Tables 4 and 6, heralds a rather unexpected result-the
emergence of a conservative Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens was the
only member of the Court to move in a liberal direction on this Table
this Term, falling a mere 5.2 points and dropping from first place to
near last in receptivity to federal claims. However, while Justice Ste-
vens's raw 1995 record is somewhat liberal when compared to 1994,
regression analysis of the past several terms demonstrates a generally
conservative reorientation in the Justice's voting pattern in federal
civil matters.6 ° In short, Justice Stevens's scores on Tables 2, 4, and 6
this Term do not reveal a jurist staunchly defending individuals against
official incursions; rather, they display a Justice who, more often than
not, has voted for the federal government.
Every other Justice increased, by wide margins, his or her friend-
liness to federal government claims this Term. Justice Ginsburg
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
Cases decided against the federal government:
Henderson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1638 (1996)
Degen v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1777 (1996)
United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1793 (1996)
United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2106 (1996)
(one issue decided for the federal government, another against)
United States v. Winstar Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2432 (1996).
Although there are only 18 cases analyzed on Table 2, one case (Reorganized CF & I
Fabricators) involved two issues, one decided for and one against the federal government.
As a result, Table 2 tabulates 19 votes.
58. Between 1988 and 1992 federal government support on the Court averaged 68.9%.
In 1993, support dipped to 52.9% and then to 42.1% in 1994.
59. See supra text following note 53.
60. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
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jumped 23.9 points to take Justice Stevens's place at the top of the
chart with 85.0%. Below her, Justice Kennedy jumped 32.6 points,
Chief Justice Rehnquist 22.4, Justice Souter 32.9, Justice O'Connor
37.2,61 Justice Thomas 22.9, and Justice Scalia 17.9. Even Justice
Breyer, in last place, jumped 12.6 points. Six of the nine Justices
achieved all-time high conservative ratings this Term.62
The government's vastly increased success rate this Term in civil
cases may be due to several factors. The unexpectedly conservative
shift may be explained (at least partially) by the considerable number
of labor-related cases this Term in which the federal government was
aligned with union workers and opposed by corporate management.
In these cases, a conservative (pro-government) vote by a member of
the Court may actually mask a liberal vote in favor of workers'
rights.63 It is also possible that the Clinton Administration, which did
not fare well before the Court in federal civil matters initially,' has
learned to be more selective of the cases it brings before the Court.
3. Table 3: State Criminal Cases
Table 365 charts a moderate liberal trend in the Court's disposi-
tion of state criminal matters. The Majority All Cases category
reveals a slight decrease in support for state governments in criminal
cases, from 58.3% to 55.6%. A 10 point decrease in the Unanimous
61. Justice O'Connor's climb, though not statistically significant (see infra Regression
Table 2) is noteworthy because it suggests that her uncharacteristically liberal showing in
1994 was a small blip in an otherwise consistently conservative record.
62. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, Thomas, and
Breyer.
63. The following four cases involved federal agencies siding with labor in disputes
against corporations: NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995); Brother-
hood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 116 S. Ct. 595 (1996);
Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996); Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB,
116 S. Ct. 1754 (1996).
64. See supra note 32.
65. Cases decided in favor of the states:
Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 (1995)
Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996)
Calderon v. Moore, 116 S. Ct. 2066 (1996)
Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996)
Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
Cases decided against state government:
Tuggle v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 283 (1995)
Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457 (1995)
Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996)
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).
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category is countered by a 15 point increase in the ideologically more
significant Split Decisions category.
These fairly small movements by the Court as a whole could well
be overlooked, but the voting behaviors of the individual Justices re-
flect important motion away from the states in criminal matters. Re-
gression Table 3 shows that the 1995 voting patterns of the Chief
Justice and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Scalia are statistically
significant (and more liberal) than their prior records. The slight lib-
eral movement on Table 3, therefore, cannot be disregarded.
The alignment of the individual Justices on Table 3 is not unusual.
As in last Term, the Court appears to be polarized, with conservative
Justices voting together at the top of the chart and liberal Justices
forming a bloc at the bottom. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas coalesced again to top Table 3. They voted for the states
66.7% of the time, a drop of 25 points from their 1994 showings of
91.7%. This drop, although leaving them in the top conservative posi-
tions on Table 3, nevertheless displays statistically significant liberal
movement.66 Justices Scalia and Kennedy (who also evidenced statis-
tically significant liberal movement 67) rounded out the conservative
half of Table 3, casting 55.6% of their votes for state governments.
Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer, who voted for the states a
mere 22.2% of the time, and Justice Ginsburg, who favored the states
with 33.3% of her votes, took the liberal positions on Table 3 this
Term. The substantiality of these Justices' liberal voting behavior is
underscored by the nature of the cases decided unanimously. The
only two conservative votes cast by Justices Stevens, Souter and
Breyer were in unanimous cases, and these three Justices, along with
Justice Ginsburg, voted overwhelmingly against the states in the
tougher split decisions.
Justice O'Connor sat at the fulcrum between these two camps
again this Term. Her drop from 58.3% in 1994 to 44.4% in 1995 is
statistically significant6 8 and places her almost precisely halfway be-
tween the voting patterns established by the conservative and liberal
blocs.69
66. See infra Regression Table 3.
67. See infra Regression Table 3.
68. See infra Regression Table 3.
69. Justice O'Connor's score of 44.4% is about 11 points lower than Justice Scalia's
mark of 55.6%, and about 11 points higher than Justice Ginsburg's 33.3%. Justice
O'Connor is also about 20 points away from both the top and the bottom marks on Table 3.
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4. Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases
Table 470 demonstrates that the Court's support for the federal
government in criminal cases this Term increased almost as markedly
as it did in civil cases.7' In 1995, the majority voted in favor of the
government 78.6% of the time, a vault of 24.7 points over 1994. With
this showing, the Court reached conservative heights unseen since
1988. The dependability of this score, moreover, is buttressed by
strong conservative movement in each statistic graphed on Figure 4.
The Court jumped over 20 percentage points in the Unanimous cate-
gory and almost 35 points in the Split Decisions category to reach
71.4% and 85.7%, respectively. In addition, all nine Justices voted
more frequently in favor of the government than they did last Term.
This Term's results are also noteworthy for their uniformity. Six
members of the Court, politically both liberal and conservative, voted
for the government in 71.4% of criminal cases. Furthermore, every
Justice voted for the government in at least half of all cases.72 Justices
Scalia and Souter topped the chart with 78.6%, with Justice Scalia
moving dramatically upward (a 24.7 point climb from his second-to-
last place finish on Table 4 in 1994). 73
70. Cases decided in favor of the federal government:
Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356 (1995)
Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 600 (1996)
Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763 (1996)
Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996)
United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996)
Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996)
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996)
Melendez v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2057 (1996)
United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (also on Table 2 because it in-
volved two consolidated cases, one criminal and one civil forfeiture)
Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996).
Cases decided against the federal government:
Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995)
Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996)
Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
71. See supra Table 2.
72. Although Justice Stevens anchored the chart with a 50.0% showing, this figure is
nevertheless a 19.2 point increase from his 1994 bottom-of-the-chart score.
73. Justice Scalia's jump on Table 4 is statistically significant. See infra Regression
Table 3 and note 119.
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5. Table 5. First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, and
Free Exercise of Religion
Table 574 initially shows a slight conservative shift in First
Amendment claims in 1995. Overall, the Court embraced these
claims 75.0% of the time, a decrease of 2.8 points from 1994. A some-
what larger conservative movement took place in the Split Decisions
category, which dropped nearly 12 points to 71.4% in 1995.7s But,
despite these marginal shifts, Table 5 reveals that, consistent with con-
ventional wisdom, the current Court remains highly receptive of First
Amendment claims.
Indeed, three Justices demonstrated statistically significant liberal
movement this Term on First Amendment claims; the Chief Justice
and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor all increased their receptivity of
First Amendment arguments when compared with their past voting
behaviors. 76 The conservative outcomes sketched by the Majority All
Cases and Split Decision categories, furthermore, do not approach the
conservative results typical of the Court before 1994. Excluding 1991,
which in many accounts was extraordinary, 7 the Court averaged
74. Cases decided in favor of First Amendment claims:
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996)
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996)
Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996)
O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996)
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996)
(one issue decided in favor of a First Amendment claim and one issue decided
against a claim).
Cases decided against First Amendment claims:
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996)
(one issue decided against a First Amendment claim, and one issue decided in
favor of a claim).
Case where issue was addressed but failed to gain a majority vote:
Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996) (Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Thomas voted in favor of the claim; Ginsburg and Stevens voted against it;
and Breyer, O'Connor, and Souter did not reach it).
Although only seven cases reached the merits of a First Amendment question, there
are eight First Amendment votes tabulated on Table 5. This is because one case, Denver
Area, involved two free speech issues-one decided in favor of, and the other against, the
constitutional claim.
75. This result is still 12 to 50 points higher (more liberal) than all previous years on
the Table except for 1994.
76. See infra Regression Table 5.
77. See 1991 Study, supra note 1, at 5-7, 16-17 (cataloging the surge of a centrist bloc
comprised of Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Souter, Kennedy, and O'Connor, and noting the
Court's acceptance of claims in such politically charged cases as Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S 833 (1992); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Lee v. International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992)).
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40.6% in the Majority All Cases category between 1988 and 1993. Ac-
cordingly, it is not at all clear that Table 5 shows conservative move-
ment overall. Rather, the Court's First Amendment posture probably
remains unchanged from 1994-a clear high-water mark for First
Amendment claims.
However, while the Court remains supportive of First Amend-
ment claims, it has not been able to muster consistent voting blocs to
resolve those claims. The First Amendment, in fact, has been a
uniquely confusing battleground this Term. Although the Court was
able to muster at least five votes to dispose of two cases involving First
Amendment rights in the context of government employment and one
case involving the constitutionality of cable television regulations,7
yet another First Amendment case was decided without a governing
opinion for the Court.7 9 Indeed, even in the one case decided unani-
mously this Term, there were four different rationales for the "unani-
mous" result.8" Thus, the First Amendment remains uncommonly
contentious.
Reflecting this, the voting behavior of the individual Justices on
Table 5 in 1995 was more evenly distributed along the ideological
spectrum than in 1994, when five members of the Court (including
both politically conservative and politically liberal jurists) voted for
the claim in 66.67% of cases. Justice Kennedy topped this Term's
chart with 87.5%, while Justices Scalia and Thomas tied for last place,
favoring the First Amendment claim in only 37.5% of such cases.
Both of these Justices dropped significantly from their scores last
Term.81
Surprisingly, and in contrast to Justices Scalia and Thomas, Chief
Justice Rehnquist moved from the bottom to the middle of the chart
in an uncharacteristically liberal jump, given his long-standing status
78. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996) (seven Jus-
tices concluding that the withholding of government contracts in retaliation for the exercise
of free speech violates the First Amendment); Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116
S. Ct. 2342 (1996) (same); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S.
Ct. 2374 (1996) (one five-member and one six-member coalition invalidating cable televi-
sion regulations on First Amendment grounds).
79. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996) (seven
Justice's voting in favor of First Amendment claim, but on the basis of two different ratio-
nales, neither of which attracted more than four votes).
80. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). In 44 Liquormart,
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas each wrote separate opinions. None of the
various opinions, alone, commanded five votes.
81. Justice Scalia's 18.1 point fall was not statistically significant, however. See infra
Regression Table 5. Justice Thomas dropped 29.2 percentage points.
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as the Court's most conservative Justice in the First Amendment
arena. He had anchored the chart in every Term except 1991 since
this Study began.82 This Term, the Chief Justice joined Justice Ste-
vens, historically the Court's most liberal Justice on First Amendment
questions, to vote in favor of 62.5% of such claims. Above them on
Table 5, Justices Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg combined to favor the
claim in 75.0% of cases, mirroring the Court's Majority All Cases
outcome.
6. Table 6: Equal Protection Claims
Table 683 is difficult to analyze. The Court this Term considered
five cases involving equal protection claims-a very small sample
from which to draw reliable conclusions. The statistics from prior
terms are even more frail. In 1994, the Court resolved only three
equal protection cases,' and in 1993 it considered only one.85 Given
these constraints, the statistics on Table 6 may best be viewed in the
context of the particular cases from which they are derived. The equal
protection cases, involving such contentious issues as gay rights, gen-
der discrimination, and the improper use of racial criteria,8 6 undoubt-
edly will provide ample fodder for more traditional (and subjective)
legal analysis than is contemplated by this Study.
On the whole, however, there are some notable outcomes this
Term. First, the Court's liberal movement in the Majority All Cases
category (reaching 80.0%) is the result of a 100.0% liberal result in
the Split Decisions category. Second, presiding over this liberal move-
ment were Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who are (and for the past
several Terms have been) the Justices most influential in cases decided
by a single or swing vote.87 Regression Table 6 shows that the liberal
82. In the 1988, 1989, and 1990 Terms, the Chief Justice voted for the claim less than
20% of the time. His conservatism continued, relative to the other members of the Court,
in 1992, 1993, and 1994.
83. Cases decided in favor of the equal protection claim:
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996)
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
Case decided against the equal protection claim:
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 116 S. Ct. 1091 (1996).
84. See 1994 Study, supra note 1, at 38.
85. See 1993 Study, supra note 1, at 297.
86. For a closer look at the cases assessed in Table 6, see infra Part IV.B.6.
87. See infra Part IV.A.10.
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1995 voting records on equal protection claims of Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are statistically significant.
Table 6, in short, raises the possibility that the Chief Justice,
joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Thomas, are the new liber-
als on equal protection issues. By contrast, and also as evidenced by
Tables 2 and 4, Justice Stevens is in the process of assuming the unac-
customed role of a Court conservative. In both 1994 and 1995 Justice
Stevens was twice as supportive of assertions of government regula-
tory power in the equal protection arena than other traditionally con-
servative Justices. As we stated in our review of last Term, "[w]e will
leave it to legal philosophers and other pundits to debate which is the
truly conservative or liberal position.
8 8
7. Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
Table 789 evinces significant conservative movement in the
Court's acceptance of statutory civil rights claims. The Court accepted
only a third of all claims presented this Term, whereas last Term it
accepted one half. Moreover, the conservative movement demon-
strated by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and
Scalia is statistically significant.90 Figure 7 demonstrates that the
Court has been moving in a steadily conservative direction since 1989.
Although difficulties associated with the small statistical sample on
Table 7 preclude giving this finding too much emphasis, it is almost
certainly true that the Court remains conservative in the area of statu-
tory civil rights. Whether it is becoming demonstrably more conserva-
tive is less clear.
The results on Table 7 are heavily influenced by Justice
O'Connor. The Chief Justice combined with Justices Kennedy,
Thomas and Scalia to form a decidedly conservative bloc. All four
voted for the civil rights claim in only one of the six cases involving
statutory claims, a mere 16.7%. Moreover, that one vote came in a
unanimously decided case.91 By contrast, Justices Stevens and Breyer
88. 1994 Study, supra note 1, at 39. But see infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
89. Cases decided in favor of statutory civil rights claims:
Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996)
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
Cases decided against statutory civil rights claims:
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 116 S. Ct. 1783 (1996)
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996)
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)
Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092 (1996).
90. See infra Regression Table 7.
91. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. 1307.
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(voting 83.3% of the time for the claim and appearing at the top of
Table 7), along with Justices Ginsburg and Souter (voting 66.7% of
the time for the claim), formed a liberal coalition. Thus, it was Justice
O'Connor's vote that determined the Court's disposition and her
score of 33.3% mirrors that of the Court as a whole.92
8. Table 8. Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction
Table 89 3 reveals a liberal shift in the Court's overall acceptance
of jurisdictional claims. Receptivity increased 17.1 percentage points
in the Majority All Cases category to 57.1%. A large rise in the per-
centage of unanimous cases accepting jurisdiction spurred this overall
result. In the Unanimous category, the Court's acceptance rose by
44.5 points to reach 66.7%. Conversely, acceptance in the Split Deci-
sions category declined a slight 4.6 points.
In addition to the Court's overall liberal movement this Term,
every Justice recorded a personal increase in his or her receptivity of
jurisdictional claims. Four Justices, in particular, increased their show-
ings this Term: Justice Stevens jumped from 42.1% in 1994 to 75.0%
in 1995, taking first place on Table 8; Justices Souter and Ginsburg
92. The bloc voting behavior seen this Term is not unique. Table 7 shows its strong
history. In almost every year, Justice O'Connor has played the pivotal swing role. Notice,
for example, the correlation between Justice O'Connor's score and the score of the Court
overall in 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1994, as well as 1995.
93. Cases decided in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction:
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996)
Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 637 (1996)
Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996)
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996)
Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996)
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc. 116
S. Ct. 1529 (1996)
Henderson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1638 (1996)
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996)
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996)
Calderon v. Moore, 116 S. Ct. 2066 (1996)
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996)
Felker v. 'Ibrpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
Cases decided against exercising jurisdiction:
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 116 S. Ct. 494 (1995)
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 116 S. Ct. 647 (1996)
Peacock v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 862 (1996)
Seminole Thbe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1251 (1996)
Carlisle v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996)
Degen v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1777 (1996)
Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996)
Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
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tied at 68.4%, skyrocketing 38.4 and 31.6 points respectively; and Jus-
tice Breyer climbed nearly 30 points to reach 63.2%. 94 The increased
receptivity on the part of the Court's core conservatives, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, is less pronounced. The
voting behavior of these three Justices coalesced this Term, each
achieving a 42.9% score.
9. Table 9: Federalism Cases
The Court this Term significantly increased the number of cases it
heard involving federalism issues; Table 9 tabulates a universe of
twenty-seven votes.95 As a majority, the Court voted in favor of the
94. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer did not reach the jurisdictional issue
presented in all of the cases included on Table 8. Accordingly, their percentages are calcu-
lated based on a smaller sampling than the 21 cases decided by the remaining members of
the Court.
95. Cases decided in favor of the state:
Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 (1995)
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996)
Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Serv., 116 S. Ct. 1063 (1996)
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996)
Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996)
Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996)
Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996) (two issues decided in favor of state by
differing majorities)
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996)
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (two issues decided in favor of the
state by differing majorities)
Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
Cases decided in favor of the federal government:
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848 (1996)
Wisconsin v. City of New York, 116 S. Ct. 1091 (1996)
Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103 (1996)
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996)
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996)
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996)
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996)
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1712 (1996)
Smiley v. Citibank, N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996)
Richards v. Jefferson County, 116 S. Ct. 1761 (1996)
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
Case where issue was addressed but failed to gain a majority vote:
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Ste-
vens would have voted in favor of the state; Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehn-
quist, Scalia, and Thomas did not reach the issue).
Table 9 collects 25 cases. TWo of these cases, however, presented multiple federalism
issues that increased the total possible federalism votes to 27. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct.
2174 (1996); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). Not all Justices reached every
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states only 51.9% of the time-a result in tension with the popular
perception that the Court is wildly supportive of state sovereign rights.
Indeed, the 1995 federalism score is slightly less favorable to the states
than the Court majority's 55.6% score in 1994 and continues the grad-
ual decline since 1992. The present Court, in short, is hardly a mono-
lithic supporter of states' rights.
The 1995 data do not demonstrate that the states are wholly
friendless. In unanimous decisions, the Court favored the federal gov-
ernment in 7 out of 11 cases-voting 36.4% of the time for the states,
a drop of 49.3 points from 1994's record-breaking 85.7%. However,
the 1995 Court was quite likely to support state government in close
federalism cases. In a reversal from 1994, the Court tended toward
the states in split decisions 62.5% of the time this Term, compared to
36.4% of the time in 1994. These outcomes show that, despite the
overall decline in support for state federalism positions, the Court's
support of the states rallied when the issue was controversial.
The reliability of any increased support for the states in divided
cases, however, is unclear. Mathematical analysis indicates statisti-
cally significant liberal (that is, pro-federal, not state) movement this
Term by the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Stevens.96
Although Justice Stevens has never been a big states' rights fan, the
Chief Justice has generally been second only to Justice Scalia in his
support of the states. Justice O'Connor, furthermore, often plays a
crucial role in the outcome of federalism cases. Accordingly, the
Chief Justice's and Justice O'Connor's possible realignment on feder-
alism questions does not bode well for the states.
This Term's most ardent supporter of states' rights was Justice
Thomas. Favoring the states in 56.0% of cases, he replaced Justice
Scalia (who fell to second place) at the top of Table 9. Justice Scalia,
at 55.6%, and Chief Justice Rehnquist with Justice Kennedy, both at
51.9%, varied only slightly from Justice Thomas's score. Indeed, these
Justices combined to form a pro-states wing. On the other hand, Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer and Stevens coalesced to form a bloc
favoring the federal government. Justice O'Connor's voting behavior
(44.4%) placed her nearly halfway between these two camps, sug-
federalism issue. In 1995, Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer and Stevens fell into
this category.
Compare the number of federalism cases decided this Term with that of previous
terms: 18 in 1994, 7 in 1993. See 1994 Study, supra note 1, at 41.
96. See infra Regression Table 9.
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gesting that-as with federal civil rights claims-she occupies a piv-
otal, central role in the federalism arena.
10. Table 10. Swing Vote97 Analysis
Table 1098 reveals yet another significant reversal in the fortunes
of conservative and liberal coalitions on the Court. Whereas last Term
five-member coalitions voted for liberal results in 64.3% of all swing
vote cases, conservative coalitions achieved similar results this Term
(60.0%), returning to the conservative levels reached in 1993 and
1992. But, as Figure 10 reveals, Court watchers should not hold their
breath waiting for the dust to settle on the question of which camp will
ultimately control the nation's judicial ideology. Since 1991, no coali-
tion (conservative or liberal) has managed to maintain command of
the governing majorities for more than two terms. Table 10 and Fig-
ure 10, therefore, show (if anything) that the Court's ideological vola-
tility in close cases is more likely to be settled by changes in Court
97. For a definition of what cases qualify for this category, see supra note 46.
98. Swing vote cases reaching a conservative outcome:
Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S. Ct. 7 (1995) (two categories-both conservative
outcomes)
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (three categories-all conserva-
tive outcomes)
Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116 S. Ct. 1396 (1996) (two categories-both con-
servative outcomes)
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (four categories-one conservative outcome
and three liberal outcomes)
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (three categories-one conservative outcome
and two liberal outcomes)
Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996) (two categories-both conservative
outcomes)
Leavitt v. Jane L., 116 S. Ct. 2068 (1996) (two categories-both conservative
outcomes)
Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996) (two categories-one conservative
outcome and one liberal outcome)
Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996)
Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996)
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
Swing vote cases reaching a liberal outcome:
Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996) (two categories-both liberal
outcomes)
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996)
Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996) (four categories-three liberal outcomes and
one conservative outcome)
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996) (three categories-two liberal outcomes and
one conservative outcome)
Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996) (two categories-one liberal outcome
and one conservative outcome)
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
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personnel than by some resurgence of power in either ideological
wing.
Table 10 measures the influence of each member of the Court in
effecting conservative or liberal results in close cases. The Justice who
most often votes with the majority in swing vote cases wields signifi-
cant sway in shaping the disposition of the nation's most contentious
issues. As he did in 1994 and 1993, Justice Kennedy topped the chart,
moving up 3.7 percentage points to reach 85.0%. Justice O'Connor,
also in a repeat from last Term, showed herself the next most influen-
tial Justice, voting with a majority in 80.0% of the swing vote cases.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas shared third
chair, voting with the swing vote majorities 75.0% of the time. To-
gether, these five Justices formed a formidable alliance.
Conversely, the Court's more liberal Justices significantly de-
creased their participation in swing vote majorities this Term. Justices
Ginsburg and Souter voted with the majorities 30.0% of the time,
while Justices Stevens and Breyer did so in only 25.0% of such cases.
Table 10 reveals, at bottom, what conventional wisdom suggests,
that is, that the Court remains polarized between its core conserva-
tives, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, and an
equally intrepid liberal wing, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer. As in past terms, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor led the
Court's decision-making in close cases, this Term favoring conserva-
tive results. The replacement of any member of the conservative bloc
or of either of the central swing voters, however, could rapidly change
the balance of ideological power on the Court. The relatively consis-
tent voting bloc of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, if
joined by a single jurist of like mind, could quickly dominate the
Court.
B. Regression Analysis
The voting patterns of the five Justices analyzed in Tables 1
through 10 have been tracked over a ten-year period.99 Tables 1
through 10 list the year-by-year voting scores for each Justice, ex-
pressed as a percentage of votes for the government, or for a particu-
lar type of claim, etc. The Regression Tables identify and describe
99. Specifically, the Study includes the 1986 through the 1995 Terms for all categories
except Federalism and Swing Cases, which were tracked from 1988 through 1995.
Although data from years 1986 and 1987 (where available) are included in the Study's
regression calculations, they are not included on Tables 1-10. See supra note 28.
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patterns and trends present in that data. Statistical techniques are
used to answer the following three questions:
(1) Does a Justice's score this Term depart in a statistically sig-
nificant way from his or her past average score in a given
category?
(2) Does a Justice's score this Term depart significantly from
what the Study predicted it would be based on his or her past
voting trend in a given category? 100
(3) Do the Justices show significant correlation (positive or neg-
ative) between and among their voting patterns over time?
To answer the first question, a pooled t-test statistic compares
each Justice's 1995 voting percentage' 01 with his or her historical vot-
ing percentage' 02 for each category. If the two scores differ to a statis-
tically significant degree, 0 3 the Study concludes that the Justice's
voting behavior in the 1995 Term has changed significantly from that
of previous terms.
The second question is answered by comparing a Justice's actual
score this Term with the Study's previous prediction of that score.
Predictions are based on ARIMA modeling of prior terms' data.1°4
Scores that depart significantly from ARIMA predictions may be in-
dicative of a change in the trend of voting behavior.0 5
The third question is answered by performing regression calcula-
tions between and among the Justices' voting patterns over the course
of the Study.'06 Strong correlations indicate that the score of one Jus-
tice may be predicted with some level of confidence based upon the
score of another Justice or group of Justices. Note, however, that this
100. These first two questions seek to determine if change has occurred by examining
two discrete criteria, average and trend. At times, the two measures may conflict. For
example, a Justice whose scores are 10, 20, 30, and 40 in successive terms will depart signifi-
cantly from his or her average in the next term with a score of 50. However, based on the
established trend, 50 is the most reasonable prediction for the term.
101. Identified as X2 in the Regression Tables.
102. Identified as g in the Regression Tables.
103. We have chosen a 95% confidence interval for this statistic. See infra Appendix B
for further information regarding this procedure.
104. ARIMA stands for Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average. It is a strictly
empirical (rather than theoretical), highly refined, curve-fitting procedure. It often pro-
duces better forecasts than more theoretically sophisticated models. For more information
on this procedure, see infra Appendix B and HENRY J. CASSIDY, USING ECONOMETRICS, A
BEGINNER'S GUIDE 197-203 (1981).
105. Note, however, that these predictions are susceptible to errors based on the inher-
ent difficulties in measuring human behavior, natural trend boundaries (0% and 100%),
etc.
106. The correlation among the Justices' votes in the current Term is not calculated, but
rather the correlation in the term-to-term movement of their scores in each category over
the course of this Study is calculated.
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does not imply that a particular Justice's voting pattern causes another
Justice's voting behavior.10 7
107. "Correlation" and "causation" are distinct concepts. Correlation describes the
similar (or dissimilar) movement of two variables over a range of values. For example, the
correlation between temperature and ice cream purchases might be highly positive for vari-
ous values of the "temperature" and "ice cream purchased" variables. As the "tempera-
ture" value rises over a given range (say, 85 to 105 degrees), the "ice cream purchased"
value might also rise proportionately. Perfect correlation occurs when a unit change in one
variable is always matched by a fixed proportional unit change of the other variable in the
same direction-if, for example a unit (perhaps one degree Fahrenheit) rise in "tempera-
ture" is always matched by a proportional unit (perhaps three gallons) rise in "ice cream
purchased." In this Study, two Justices' scores would be perfectly correlated if every 3%
rise or fall in the score of Justicel were always matched by a corresponding 5% rise or fall
in the score of Justice2. Justicel's "units" would be 3% variances while Justice2's "units"
would be 5% variances.
This concept is important because it illustrates that the degree of correlation between
Justices' voting patterns does not measure the extent to which they vote together. Rather,
it measures the extent to which their voting patterns move proportionally in the same (or
opposite) direction over the course of the Study. The degree of correlation is denoted by a
correlation coefficient, which is a number between +1.00 (perfect positive correlation) and
-1.00 (perfect negative correlation). A correlation coefficient of 0.00 indicates no correla-
tion between the variables.
Causation, on the other hand, is present when a change in one variable causes a
change in another variable. Although two variables may be highly correlated, they may
have absolutely no causal relationship. The perfect correlation described above (between
"temperature" and "ice cream purchased") may be purely coincidental-the rise in "ice
cream purchased" might be wholly caused by a drop in the price. Then again, the correla-
tion might be partially caused by a price reduction and partially caused by increasing tem-
perature. The tension between simple correlation and causation, as well as the difficulty in
delineating causal factors, is a major empirical barrier to regression inference. Accord-
ingly, regardless of the presence of high correlation among the Justices' voting patterns,
readers should not automatically infer causation.
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REGRESSION TABLE 1
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
(1) percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice 9 Confidence Stadrd for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 Term
a Doeviation of Term in voting behavior? voting
Mean (s) (X2) percentage)
51.209 33.966
Kennedy -h 15.793 1 12.764 41.112 No (-7.146) 34.530
54.223 37.353
O'Connor k 11.925 1 10.662 47.059 No (-9.707) 41.357
68.123 64.500
Rehnqui ± 9.557 8.545 43.750 Yes (+20.75) 51.652
57.766 51.036
Scaia ±9.1" 1 8.176 52.941 No (-1.905) 53.251
36.217 33.062
Stevens ± 6.949 1 6.213 23.529 Yea (+9.533) 32.497
Correlations with other Jstices Regression equation(s) 1(1) Regression r2 (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) (2) "Student's t" non-rejections
O'Connor Kennedy (0.912) O'Connor = 14.8 + 0.75 (1) r2 (adj) = 80.9%
Kennedy (2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
Rehnquist Kennedy (0.720) Rehnquist = 31.3 + 0.673 (1) r2 (adj) = 45.0%
Kennedy (2) no constant or variable falls
within a "zero" null hypothesis
REGRESSION TABLE 2
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
(A) percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice 99% Confidence Standard for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 Term
Interval for True Deviation of p Term in voting behavior? voting
Mean (s) (X2) percentage)
52.939 44.503
Kennedy ± 13.786 1 12.326 80.000 Yes (-35.497) 49.645
59.090 37.254
O'Connor ± 15.85 1 54.174 75.000 No (-27.746) 21.592
69.942 52.118
Rehnquist 75.000 No (-22.883) Could not be
± 12.591 11.258 estimated
61.931 44.931
Scalia 11."9 60.000 No (-15.069) 48.703
52.939 79.771
Stevens ± 13.786 12.326 63.158 Yes (+16.613) 65.417
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Correlations with other Justlices Regression equation(s) (1) Reg-sion r5 (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) (2) "Student's t" non-rejections
Rehnquist Kennedy (0.726) Rehnquist = 32.3 + 0.569 (1) r2 (adj) = 46.0%
Kennedy (2) no constant or variable falls
within a "zero" null hypothesis
Scalia Kennedy (0.755) Scalia = 22.6 + 0.583 Kennedy (1) r2 (adj) = 50.8%
(2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
O'Connor (0.708) Scalia = 27.6 + 0.574 O'Connor (1) r2 (adj) = 44.0%
(2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
Scalia - 14.6 + 0.461 Kennedy (1) r2 (adJ) - 62.8%
+ 0.273 O'Connor (2) constant and O'Connor fall
within a "zero" null hypothesis
ReInquist (0.844) Scalia = 1.6 + 0.853 Rehnquist (1) r2 (adj) = 67.5%
(2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
Scalia - 11.3 + 0.383 Kennedy (1) r2 (adj) - 50.6%
+ 0.351 Rehnquist (2) constant and all variables
falls within a "zero" null
hypothesis
Scalla = 0.3 + 0.247 O'Connor (1) r 2 (adj) = 70.3%
+ 0.664 Rehnquist (2) constant and O'Connor fall
within a "zero" null hypothesis
Scalia - 10.0 + 0.377 Kennedy (1) r2 (adj) = 57.3%
+ 0.242 O'Connor + 0.171 (2) constant and all variables




Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
(p) percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice 99% Confidence t for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 Term
Interval for True Deviaton of F Term in voting behavior? voting
Mean (s) (X2) percentage)
66.875 Could not be
Kennedy : 15.481 12-513 55.556 Yes estimated 60.491
65.001 60.080
O'Connor 15.291 F 13.671 44.444 Yes (+15.636) 51.378
82.577 88.018
Rehnquist ± 8.976 8.025 66.667 Yes (+21.351) 90.830
75.929 86.371
Scalia ± 11.4% 55.556 Yes (+30.815) 78.443
21.423 14.591
Stevens ±12.720 T - qT3 22.222 No (-7.631) 16.565
Correlations with other Justices Regression equation(s) (1) Regression r2 (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) (2) "Student's t" non-rejections
Rehnquist O'Connor (0.763) Rehnquist - 50.8 + 0.480 [(1) r2 (adj) = 53.0%
O'Connor I (2) no constant or variable falls
[within a "zero" null hypothesis
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REGRESSION TABLE 4
FPMERAL CIMINAL CASES
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
() percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice Confidence Standard for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 Term99%5 C Term in voting behavior? voting
Interval for True Deviation of A -
Mean (s) (D percentage)
68.729 62.104
Kennedy :k 15.883 1 12.837 71.429 No (-9.325) 61.618
75.906 71.316
O'Connor - 6.943-- 6.207 71.429 No (-0.113) 66.942
79.242 74.068
Rehoquist 7.394 1 6.611 71.429 Yes (+2.639) 70.710
63.071 60.700 Could not be
Scalia _11.851 1 10.596 78.57 Yes (-17.870) estimated
45.581 32.834
Stevens 16.927 15.134 50.000 No (-17.166) 29.167
Correlations with other Justices TRegression equation(s) (1) Regression r2 (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) 1 _(2) "Student's t" non-rejections
Scalia [Kennedy (0.735) Scalia = 15.0 + 0.710 Kennedy (1) r2 (adi) = 47.5
(2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
REGRESSION TABLE 5
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION AND FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
0 percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice 99% Co dencI Standard for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 Term
Cnfidec Stndr Term in voting behavior? voting
Interval for True Deviation of 1z - iv ge i vtg
Mean (s) (X2) percentage)
62.725 86.566
Kennedy ± 24.855 1 20.059 87.500 Yes (-0.934) 100.000
45.866 72.797
O'Connor ± 21.888 1 19.569 62.500 Yes (+10.297) 73.875
29.669 57.251
Rehnquist ± 18.521 1 16.559 62.500 Yes (+5.249) 70.695
42.908 70.918
Sca + 20.666 1 18.477 37.500 No (+33.418) 55.264
63.912 76.320
Stevens ± 21.346 1 19.085 62.500 No (+13.82) 65.854
Correlations with other Justices Regression equation(s) (1) Regression r2 (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) 1(2) "Student's t" non-rejections
Rehnquist Kennedy (0.886) Rehnquist = -18.8 + 0.817 (1) r2 (ad) - 75.3%
Kennedy (2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
O'Connor (0.770) (1) r2 (ad) = 54.2%
Rehnquist = -2.8 + 0.752 (2) constant falls within a
O'Connor "zero" null hypothesis
(1) r2 (adj) - 88.9%
Rehnqist= -21.9 + 0.587 (2) O'Connor falls within a
Kennedy + 0.381 O'Connor "zero" null hypothesis
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REGRESSION TABLE 6
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
(1) percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice 9 andard for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 TermInterval for True Iviatio of Term in voting behavior? voting
mean (s) (X) JPercentage)j
49.371 81.826
Kennedy 1 25.855 80.000 Yes (+1.826) 77.319
46.189 83.146
O'Connor . 30.229 F 27.037 80.000 Yes (+3.146) 76.766
28.319 Could not be
Renqust * 25.900 1 23.326 60.000 Yes estimated 48.991
27.022 24.778
Scalia + 24.487 21.594 40.000 No (-15.222) 40.638
50.214 97.340
Stevens 34.876 31.183 40.000 No (+57.34) 71.080
Correlations with other Justices Regression equation(s) (1) Regression r2 (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) 1(2) "Student's t" non-rejections
O'Connor Kennedy (0.895) O'Connor = -2.3 + 0.966 (1) r2 (adj) = 77.3%
Kennedy (2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
Scalia Rehnquist (0.944) Scalia = 2.44 + 0.822 Rehnquist (1) r2 (adj) = 87.7%
(2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
REGRESSION TABLE 7
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
(p percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 Term
9%Confidence I Standard Term in voting behavior? voting
Interval for Tre Deviation of /u T percetage
Mean (s) (x2) percetage
44.724 Could not be
Kennedy ± 18.910 15.293 16.667 Yes estimated 20.337
47.632 44.561
O'Connor . 10.812 1 9.632 33.333 Yes (+11.228) 48.781
39.208 39.574
Rehnquist 46 489 1 5.802 16.667 Yes (+22.907) 57.028
42.908 21.475
Scalia . 11.367 16.667 Yes (+4.808) 16.561
76.056 97.340
Stevens ±-13.041 10.540 83.333 No (+14.007) 78.205
Correlatios with other Justices on equation(s) (1) Regression r (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.07) J(2) "Student's t" non-rejections
Scalia e d (0.882) Sc alia = 11.6 + 0.693 Kennedy (1) r2 (adj) = 74.6%
(2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
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REG2ESON TABLE 8
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO THE EXERCISE OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
(1) percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice 99% Confidence fStandard or 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 Term99 oniene anad Term in voting behaviorl voting
Interval for True Deviation of r 
iv
Mean (s) (V2) percentage)
53.520 39.079
Kennedy ± 17.733 F 12.716 57.143 No (-18.064) 45.716
51.061 36.813
O'Connor ± 16 054 1 14.354 47.619 No (-10.806) 38.200
50.043 29.629
Rchnquist ± 16.ot 14.932 42.857 No (-13.228) 31.421
46.721 34.681
Scalta ± 14.491 1 12.957 42.857 No (-8.176) 32.231
65.794 43.500
Stevens ± 17.401 15.558 75.000 No (-31.500) 60.189
Correlations with other Justices Regression equation(s) (1) Regression rz (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) (2) "Student's t" non-rejections
O'Connor Kennedy (0.880) O'Connor - -4.3 + 0.992 (1) r2 (adj) - 74.2%
Kennedy (2) constant falls within a
.zero" null hypothesis
Rehnquist Kennedy (0.904) Rehnquist - -7.5 + 1.02 Kennedy (1) r2 (adi) = 79.0%
(2) constant falls within a
.zero" null hypothesis
O'Connor (0.941) Rehnquist - -.081 + 0.989 (1) e2 (adj) - 87.2%
O'Connor (2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
Rehnquist = -4.83 + 0.391 (1) r2 (adj) = 87.5%
Kennedy + 0.630 O'Connor (2) constant and all variables
fall within a "zero" null
hypothesis
Scalia Kennedy (0.818) Scalia = 1.4 + 0.802 Kennedy (.1) r2 (adj) = 62.1%
(2) constant falls within a
.zero" null hypothesis
O'Connor (0.981) Scalia = 1.35 + 0.887 O'Connor (I) r (adj) - 95.8%
(2) constant and all variables
fall within a "zero" null
Rehnquist (0.949) Scalia = 6.05 + 0.817 Rehnquist hypothesis
(1) r2 (adj) = 88.8%
(2) constant and all variables
Scalia - 5.77 - 0.204 Kennedy + fall within a "zero" null
1.01 O'Connor hypothesis
(1) r2 (adj) = 96.6%
Scalla = 8.48 - 0.153 Kennedy + (2) constant and Kennedy fall
0.939 Rehnquist within a "zero" null hypothesis
(1) rz (adj) = 84.2%
Scalia = 1.50 + 0.699 O'Connor (2) constant and Kennedy fall
+ 0.190 Rehnquist within a "zero" null hypothesis
(1) r2 (ad) - 95.9%
Scala - 7.19 - 0.320 Kennedy + (2) constant and Rehnquist fall
0.828 O'Connor + 0.295 within a "zero" null hypothesis
Rehnquist (1) r2 (adj) - 97.7%
(2) constant, Kennedy, and
Rehnquist fall within a -zero
null hypothesis
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Stevens IKennedy (0.705)
Rehnquist (0.728)
Stevens = 16.0 + 0.930 Kennedy
Stevens = 29.0 + 0.764
Rehnquist
Stevens = 22.3 + 0.087 Kennedy
+ 0.829 Rehnquist
(1) r
2 (adj) = 42.6%
(2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
(1) r2 (adj) = 47.2%
(2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
(1) r
2 (adj) = 45.2%
(2) constant and all variables
fall within a "zero" null
hypothesis
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REGRESSION TABLE 9
FEDERALSM CASES
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
) percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 Termta T v of Term in voting behavior? votingInterval for Tru Ie Deviato f OD
Mean I s) Percentage)
52.276 42.823
Kennedy . 20.934 1 16.920 51.852 No (-9.029) 49.146
57.479 56.130
O'Connor :h 18.902 7 15.277 44.444 Yes (+11.686) 62.131
64.416 77.418
Rehnquist :h 17.174 1 13.881 51.852 Yes (+25.566) 69.360
57.397 74.365
Scalia ± 24.807 1 20.051 55.556 No (+18.809) 73.761
47.528 57.935
Stevens - 14.970 I 12.099 29.630 Yes (+28.305) 42.631
Correlations with other Justices Regression equation(s) 1(1) Regression r2 (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) 1(2) "Student's t" non-rejections
O'Connor Kennedy (0.875) O'Connor = 12.9 + 0.826 (1) r2 (adj) = 73.2%
Kennedy (2) constant falls within a
zero" null hypothesis
Rehnquist Kennedy (0.791) Rehnquist = 27.4 + 0.682 (1) r2 (adj) - 57.2%
Kennedy (2) no constant or variable falls
within a "zero" null hypothesis
O'Connor (0.901) (1) r' (adj) - 78.5%
Rehnquist = 16.9 + 0.823 (2) constant falls within a
O'Connor "zero" null hypothesis
(1) r2 (adj) = 75.0%
(2) constant and all variables
Rehnquist = 16.9 + 0.008 fall within a "zero" null
Kennedy + 0.815 O'Connor hypothesis
Scalia Kennedy (0.873) Scalia = 3.2 + 1.03 Kennedy (1) r2 (adj) = 72.7%
(2) constant falls within a "zero"
null hypothesis
O'Connor (0.774) Scalia = 2.8 + 0.972 O'Connor (1) r2 (adi) - 54.1%
(2) constant falls within a "zero"
null hypothesis
Scalla = 2.5 + 0.990 Kennedy + (1) r2 (adj) = 68.3%
0.054 O'Connor (2) constant and all variables fall
within a "zero" null hypothesis
Rehnquist (0.872) Scalia = -18.4 + 1.20 Rehnquist (1) r2 (adj) = 72.7%
(2) constant falls within a "zero"
null hypothesis
Scalla = -15.2 + 0.579 Kennedy (1) r2 (adj) - 80.0%
+ 0.669 Rehnquist (2) constant and all variables fall
within a "zero" null hypothesis
Scalia = -19.0 - 0.083 O'Connor (1) e' (adj) = 68.2%
+ 1.28 Rehnquist (2) constant and all variables fall
within a "zero" null hypothesis
Scalia = -19.0 + 0.980 Kennedy (1) r2 (adj) = 87.5%
- 0.981 O'Connor + 1.27 (2) constant and O'Connor fall
Rehnquist within a "zero" null hypothesis
REGRESSION TABLE 10
SWING VOTE ANALYSIS
Mean Voting Percentage, Prediction for
1986-1994 Actual voting Did 1995 show a 1995 Term, and
(11) percentage statistically (error compared Prediction for
Justice 99% Confidence I Stan for 1995 significant change to actual 1995 1996 TermCn ide Sndr Term in voting behavior? voting
Interval for True Deviation of To
Mean (s) 04) percentage)
73.615 84.333
Kennedy t 15.185 1 12.615 85.000 Yes (-0.667) 84.949
63.151 61.831
O'Connor 13.530 10.936 80.000 Yes (-18.169) 90.669
66.330 Could not be
Rehnquist ± 13.569 1 10.967 75.000 No estimated 67.004
62.984 64.174
Scalia ± 18.065 1 14.600 75.000 Yes (-10.828) 60.160
45.491 Could not be Could not be
Stevens - 14.317 1 11.572 25.000 Yea estimated estimated
Correlations with other Justices Regression equation(s) (1) Regression r2 (adjusted);
(-0.7 > p > +0.7) 1(2) "Student's t" non-rejections
Scalia Rehnquist (0.878) Scalia = -14.6 + 1.117 Rehnquist (1) r
2 (adj) = 73.8%
I (2) constant falls within a
"zero" null hypothesis
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1. Regression Table 1: Civil Cases-State Government Versus a Private
Party
Regression Table 1 shows a statistically significant shift in the vot-
ing behavior of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens during the 1995
Term, both of whom recorded their lowest scores ever in this cate-
gory. 08 The decreases in support for state government by the other
Justices, while notable, were not statistically significant.
Last year's predictions for voting behavior in this category were
within 10 points for Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Stevens, and
within 2 points for Justice Scalia. Conversely, our prediction for the
Chief Justice was high by about 21 points, making his voting behavior
the most unexpected in the category.
Regression analysis reveals a strong link between the votes of
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, whose voting patterns are linked
about 81% of the time in state civil cases.'09 What initially appears to
be a significant relationship between the voting behavior of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy (whose voting patterns on state
civil cases in 1995 are quite close) is, in reality, of little moment. Over
the ten-year course of this Study, the voting patterns of these Justices
are linked only about 45% of the time.
108. See supra Table 1. Two related cases seem to account for the Chief Justice's result.
Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996), and O'Hare Truck
Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996), both involved contractors' rights
to protected political speech against government officials. The Chief Justice supported
these claims (voting against the state), while generally conservative Justices Scalia and
Thomas opposed them.
Justice Stevens's low showing in favor of state government, moreover, may actually
understate his generally liberal ideological orientation. Notably, three of Justice Stevens's
four votes for state government produced arguably liberal results. In Jaffee v. Redmond,
116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996), he voted to recognize a "psychotherapist privilege" and to extend
the privilege to social workers (two votes in favor of the state). In Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct.
1894 (1996), he voted to support a state's plan for carving voting districts which tended to
ensure majorities of racial minorities.
109. We say that voting patterns are "linked" when the regression equation describing
the relationship between the voting patterns of two or more Justices reasonably "explains"
the actual data points generated by the relationship. The adjusted r2 statistic we use to
make this determination is a measure of the proportion of the variance in one variable that
can be attributed (linked) to a variance in another variable (keeping in mind that causation
is in no way implied). An r2 value of 1 (or 100%) indicates a perfect fit. A value of 0 (or
0%) indicates that the regression equation is no more useful than the sample mean in
describing the relationship between the variables. For a more complete explanation of this
statistic, see infra Appendix B and CAssroY, supra note 104.
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2. Regression Table 2: Civil Cases-Federal Government Versus a
Private Party
Justices Kennedy and Stevens exhibited statistically significant
changes in their voting behavior this Term in civil cases involving the
federal government. Justice Kennedy recorded his highest score ever
for this category and Justice Stevens his third highest. 110 Similarly, all
other Justices voted in favor of the government at a rate greater than
their previous averages. As a result, the Court's composite voting dis-
played a strong corresponding conservative trend, rising nearly 33
points from last Term."'
The voting patterns predicted for 1995 did not closely correspond
to actual voting scores. This can be explained, in part, by the signifi-
cant conservative shift demonstrated by the entire Court on Regres-
sion Table 2 this Term. When (as in 1995) all nine Justices openly
embrace more federal civil claims than previously, individual depar-
tures from predicted trends-here ranging from a 35-point miss for
Justice Kennedy to about a 15-point miss for Justice Scalia-are not
unexpected.12
Examination of the rather significant departures from this Study's
voting predictions, however, does yield one interesting inference: Jus-
tice Stevens's recent voting patterns may have been influenced by the
1992 change from a Republican to a Democratic Administration. In
1993, Justice Stevens radically changed his voting behavior, jumping
over 35 percentage points to favor the government in 70.6% of the
cases." 3 Since 1993, his support of the federal government has de-
creased somewhat. However, given the magnitude of his 1993 shift,
his scores in 1994 and 1995 have remained significantly conservative
as measured against his mean voting percentage. The fact that Justice
Stevens's 1995 showing fell nearly 17 points below what was predicted
based on his post-1992 voting pattern suggests he has come to occupy
a new niche in civil cases involving the federal government.
Justice Stevens's 63% voting pattern in favor of the federal gov-
ernment departs significantly from his past patterns which, except for
the past two Terms, have generally hovered well below the 63%
mark. 114 In the past two Terms, however, Justice Stevens has shown
110. See supra Table 2.
111. See supra Table 2.
112. The 20-point rise in the Chief Justice's score this Term, see supra Table 2, though
relatively large, is not a statistically significant departure from his previous average.
113. See supra Table 2.
114. See supra Table 2.
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remarkably increased receptivity to claims made by the federal gov-
ernment-moving from a score of 34.4% in the 1992 Term to scores of
68.4% and 70.6% in 1993 and 1994.115 His predicted score for 1995
was based on the trend established by that dramatic rise. Justice Ste-
vens, in 1995, continued to vote more often in favor of the federal
government than was predicted from the average of his prior Term's
behavior, although (by missing his predicted 1995 mark) he has now
moderated that trend from the patterns exhibited in 1993 and 1994.
What the statistical significance and predicted score calculations
suggest, therefore, is that Justice Stevens has indeed altered his voting
behavior. The data on Regression Table 2 indicate that (as hypothe-
sized in last year's Study" 6) Justice Stevens has reoriented himself to
new political realities. During the Bush Administration, he generally
cast liberal votes against the federal government. Under the new Ad-
ministration, by contrast, he is now consistently casting more con-
servative votes-perhaps in favor of politically liberal claims brought
by a politically liberal Administration. Further dramatic increases in
Justice Stevens's receptivity to federal civil claims, however, is not
likely-the Study now predicts that future votes in favor of the federal
government will hover in the current range."
7
Many correlations among voting patterns are noted on Regres-
sion Table 2. The strongest in this category are between Justice Scalia
and the Chief Justice, whose voting patterns are linked about 68% of
the time. Furthermore, when the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor
vote together, Justice Scalia's voting pattern is linked with them about
70% of the time. Other correlations, however, are fairly weak.
3. Regression Table 3: State Criminal Cases
All Justices listed on Regression Table 3, except Justice Stevens,
voted significantly less often in favor of state government this Term
than their previous averages would suggest. This broad-based and sta-
tistically significant liberal shift is unusual. The import of that shift,
however, may be diminished somewhat because the state criminal cat-
egory comprised only nine cases this Term; each case thus accounted
for 11 percentage points in the Justices' scores. Moreover, one-third
of the decisions tabulated on Regression Table 3 were decided unani-
mously against the state. These facts may have skewed this Term's
115. See supra Table 2.
116. See 1994 Study, supra note 1, at 31.
117. Justice Stevens's predicted score for 1996 is 65%, only 2 points higher than his
score this Term.
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statistics in a liberal direction.118 Despite these caveats, the moderate
liberal movement shown by Regression Table 3-because of its statis-
tical significance-cannot be completely discounted.
The accuracy of our predictions of the Justices' voting percent-
ages in this category ranged from within 8 points for Justice Stevens to
31 points for Justice Scalia. In addition, a weak correlation between
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor is noted on the table; their voting
patterns were linked about 53% of the time.
4. Regression Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases
Regression Table 4 shows statistically significant changes in the
voting patterns of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. The
Chief Justice voted less often in favor of the federal government than
was predicted based on his previous voting average, while Justice
Scalia voted more often in favor of federal criminal prosecutors than
in the past. Neither of these shifts, however, should be
overemphasized.
The Chief Justice's departure from his historical average is small
in absolute terms (about 9 points). The statistical significance of this
shift is due to his remarkable consistency in this category over the
course of this Study, with a standard deviation of a little more than 6
points. Justice Scalia's score, moreover, was heavily influenced by the
fact that five cases were decided unanimously in favor of the
government. 19
Only one weak correlation is shown in Regression Table 4. The
voting patterns of Justices Scalia and Kennedy were linked about 48%
of the time.
5. Regression Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression,
Association, and Free Exercise of Religion
Regression Table 5 shows a statistically significant change from
the historical voting averages for three of the five Justices analyzed.
The Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor all moved in a
liberal direction. This movement, furthermore, is consistent with the
118. If just one of the unanimous cases this Term had been decided in favor of the state,
the scores of the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy would no longer show a statistically
significant shift, and Justice Stevens's score would show a conservative shift. Such are the
limitations of the small universe of cases from which this Study is derived.
119. The impact of unanimous cases upon Justice Scalia's score is underscored by the
fact that half of the federal criminal cases this Term were decided unanimously and two of
Justice Scalia's three votes against the federal government were cast in these unanimous
cases.
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three Justices' predicted trends: Justice Kennedy's actual voting pat-
tern departed less than 1 point from the score predicted on the basis
of his recent First Amendment votes, while Justice O'Connor's and
the Chief Justice's actual voting patterns departed about 10 and 5
points, respectively, from the predictions calculated from their past
First Amendment votes.120 This data appears to validate the ideologi-
cal significance of the Justices' liberal movement in the First Amend-
ment arena.
Two fairly strong correlations are noted in the Table. The Chief
Justice's voting pattern is linked with that of Justice Kennedy about
75% of the time, and when Justices Kennedy and O'Connor vote to-
gether, their pattern is linked with that of the Chief Justice almost
89% of the time. These correlations-together with the inferences
drawn from the statistical significance and predicted score calculations
discussed above-suggest that these three Justices are emerging as a
reliable voting bloc on First Amendment questions.
6. Regression Table 6: Equal Protection Claims
Regression Table 6 shows a statistically significant difference be-
tween the current and past voting patterns of three Justices. The
Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and O'Connor all voted in a more
liberal manner this Term than in the past. Conclusions based upon
these calculations, however, are tenuous due to the small number of
cases involved (five) and the questionable classification of the results
in two of those cases as liberal.
In Bush v. Vera'2' and Shaw v. Hunt," the question before the
Court was whether state officials had violated equal protection stric-
tures by their use of race in drawing voting district boundaries. Five-
member majorities, consisting of the Chief Justice and Justices Ken-
nedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, upheld the equal protection
claim in both cases-a "liberal" result under the definitions used in
this Study. But, while this outcome favored the claim of individual
rights pressed by the plaintiffs, it arguably (at least in the eyes of the
four dissenting "conservative" Justices) ignored the rights of voters
who had been subjected to discrimination in the past."23 Because it is
120. This is a good example of how a Justice's score for a term may differ significantly
from his or her previous average for a category and yet be predictable from the Justice's
voting trend for that category over the course of the Study.
121. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
122. 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
123. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1978 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he risk of true 'discrimi-
nation' in this case is extremely tenuous in light of the remedial purpose the classification is
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not entirely clear who is casting a vote "for the individual" and
"against the government" in such cases, it is difficult to assign unam-
biguously either the "liberal" or "conservative" label to the voting
outcomes in Bush and Shaw.
This difficulty is borne out by the fact that there is a "reverse-
image" linking of Regression Table 6 and Regression Table 7 (Statu-
tory Civil Rights). The Justices who voted in a "liberal" fashion in
Bush and Shaw (favoring the equal protection claim) rejected the ar-
gument that the Voting Rights Act provided a complete defense to the
equal protection claim, a "conservative" result. 24 Thus, while Re-
gression Table 6 shows statistically significant liberal movement for
the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, Regression Ta-
ble 7 shows equally significant conservative movement for the same
Justices (as well as Justice Scalia).
Despite the above difficulties, the Court does appear to be in-
creasing its receptivity to equal protection claims. In addition to Bush
and Shaw, the Court ratified equal protection claims raised by gay
rights proponents"z and women seeking admission to previously
male-only military schools.'26 In fact, the only equal protection claim
the Court rejected (by a unanimous vote) was a plea to apply height-
ened equal protection scrutiny to the methodology employed by the
federal government in the last federal census. 27 This, of course, is
hardly a surprising outcome, considering the usual judicial deference
the Court grants in regulatory and economic matters. The Court's re-
ceptivity to the four substantial equal protection claims it heard this
Term insures future ideological growth in this area of the law, even if
it remains debatable whether this Term's ideological movement was
liberal or conservative.
The predictions for this Term's equal protection voting patterns
were quite close for Justices Kennedy and O'Connor (within about 2
and 3 points, respectively). By contrast, the prediction for Justice Ste-
intended to achieve and the long history of resistance to giving minorities a full voice in the
political process."); Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I am convinced that
the Court's aggressive supervision of state action designed to accommodate the political
concerns of historically disadvantaged minority groups is seriously misguided.")
124. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1962 ("The districts before us exhibit a level of racial ma-
nipulation that exceeds what § 2 could justify."); Shaw, 116 S. Ct. at 1903 ("[W]e find that
creating an additional majority-black district was not required under a correct reading of
§ 5 and that District 12, as drawn, is not a remedy narrowly tailored to the State's professed
interest in avoiding § 2 liability.")
125. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
126. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
127. Wisconsin v. City of New York, 116 S. Ct. 1091 (1996).
Fall 19961
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
vens missed by an impressive 57 points. Thus a Justice who, based on
past performance trends, was predicted to accept nearly all equal pro-
tection claims pressed upon the Court instead voted in favor of only
two of the five claims presented. A quick glance at Table 6, however,
helps to explain the difficulty of predicting Justice Stevens's behavior.
His past scores range from 0% to 100%, yielding a standard deviation
of 31.2 points! Moreover, as noted above, the ideological nature of
the equal protection claims presented this Term present problematic
issues of characterization.
Two strong correlations are noted in Regression Table 6. The
voting patterns of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are linked in about
77% of cases. The patterns of Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice are
linked almost 88% of the time.
7. Regression Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims
The scores for all of the Justices listed on Regression Table 7 ex-
cept Justice Stevens show statistically significant conservative move-
ment. This movement is also reflected in the Court's general
conservative trend on statutory civil rights, shown on Figure 7.
Although reliable statistical generalizations regarding statutory civil
rights are difficult because of the small number of cases addressing the
issue, a consistent conservative trend over the course of this Study is
apparent.
Differences between the Study's predicted scores for 1995 and
the actual scores ranged from within 5 points for Justice Scalia to al-
most 23 points for the Chief Justice. However, because each vote in
this category moves a Justice's voting percentage by 20 points, a 23-
point miss is not particularly surprising.
Comparison of Justice Stevens's predicted and actual scores on
Regression Table 7 with his predicted and actual scores on Regression
Table 6 is interesting. On Regression Table 6, Justice Stevens's actual
performance differed 57 points from his predicted performance. On
Regression Table 7, however, the Justice's actual performance was
about 14 points from his predicted performance. This contrast con-
firms Justice Stevens's long-standing receptivity to statutory civil
rights claims, as well as his emerging hostility to equal protection
claims like those presented in Bush and Shaw. The data from Regres-
sion Tables 6 and 7, in short, demonstrate that-at least in the difficult
area of individual rights and race-Justice Stevens is on a quite differ-
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ent ideological plane than the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia and Kennedy.
1 2 8
One fairly strong correlation is noted on Regression Table 7. The
voting patterns of Justices Scalia and Kennedy are linked almost 75%
of the time.
8. Regression Table 8. Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of
Federal Jurisdiction
Regression Table 8 reveals no statistically significant departures
from past voting patterns. Differences between the Study's predicted
scores and actual scores varied from about 8 points for Justice Scalia
to more than 31 points for Justice Stevens.
The degree of ideological stability revealed by Regression Table 8
is worthy of note. Voting patterns on jurisdictional issues are corre-
lated among virtually all of the analyzed Justices. This high degree of
correlation may suggest that the criteria each Justice uses in determin-
ing jurisdictional issues have remained reasonably stable over time or
even that the Justices employ highly similar criteria in reaching their
decisions.' 9
Particularly interesting are the linkages between the Chief Justice
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Scalia. The Chief Justice's votes
on jurisdictional issues are correlated with those of Justice Kennedy
about 79% of the time, and with Justice O'Connor about 87% of the
time. Justice O'Connor's voting pattern, in turn, is linked with that of
Justice Kennedy about 74% of the time on jurisdictional issues. Jus-
tice Scalia, finally, shows a 95% correlation with Justice O'Connor, a
62% correlation with Justice Kennedy, and nearly an 89% correlation
with the Chief Justice. These Justices, in short, often vote together as
a bloc on jurisdictional issues.
9. Regression Table 9: Federalism Cases
The scores of three Justices (the Chief Justice and Justices Ste-
vens and O'Connor) show a statistically significant departure from
past averages in this category, each in a liberal direction. This liberal
shift may result from the fact that seven of eleven unanimous federal-
128. This conclusion, of course, is hardly news to anyone who has read the various
opinions in Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). It is interesting, nevertheless, that the
divergent ideological views expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions in Shaw can
be consistently (and mathematically) demonstrated.
129. Although the Justices might weigh the criteria differently, and thus do not vote
identically in each case, their patterns of voting and relative movements from term-to-term
show a high degree of correlation.
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ism cases were decided against state government, yielding the lowest
state success rate in unanimous federalism decisions ever recorded by
this Study. Statistically significant liberal movement by two generally
conservative jurists (the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor), how-
ever, cannot be ignored and suggests that the overall (albeit small)
liberal movement by the Court this Term is important.
Justice Stevens's movement on Regression Table 9 is particularly
dramatic. Four of Justice Stevens's eight votes in favor of the states
were in unanimous and (presumably) less ideologically charged cases.
Of Justice Stevens's four remaining conservative federalism votes, two
were voting district cases involving assertions of racial gerrymander-
ing where Justice Stevens voted to uphold the districting plan130 -con-
servative results under the terms of the Study but, nevertheless,
arguably liberal outcomes. Therefore, Justice Stevens's movement
away from the states on federalism issues may be even more remarka-
ble than first appears.' 3'
Differences between predicted and actual scores varied from a
low of about 9 points for Justice Kennedy to a high of about 28 points
for Justice Stevens, whose score was down this term by more than 25
points from his scores for each of the previous three Terms. 32 As in
Regression Table 7, the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia
and Kennedy demonstrate close correlations.
10. Regression Table 10. Swing Vote Analysis
During the 1994 Term, liberal coalitions held sway in the majority
of swing decisions, prompting us to suggest (as in 1991, when liberal
coalitions also decided the majority of single-vote outcomes 33) that
the Court was moderating the course set by the conservative coali-
tions that had prevailed in 1992 and 1993.134 But, in 1995, ideological
control has again reversed, with conservative coalitions governing the
result in 60% of all swing vote cases.
This pronounced volatility in the ideological control of swing de-
cisions is presented in graphic form on Figure 10. The vacillations ap-
130. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
131. By contrast, the departures of the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor from their
previous means were barely significant in a statistical sense, each turning on a single case
out of 27 this Term. Also, if the unanimously decided cases are removed, leaving only the
closer cases in which the Justices' ideological tendencies become more apparent, both the
Chief Justice's and Justice O'Connor's scores fall comfortably within their historic ranges.
132. See supra Table 9.
133. See 1991 Study, supra note 1, at 28.
134. 1994 Study, supra note 1, at 43-44.
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parent on Figure 10 suggest that the swing vote outcome for any
particular term has little value in predicting future ideological move-
ment. With this caveat in mind, Regression Table 10 nevertheless sug-
gests that the 1995 swing back to conservative control is significant.
Of the Justices listed on the Table, only the Chief Justice's voting
pattern did not vary in a statistically significant way from past records.
Justices Kennedy's, O'Connor's, and Scalia's presence with governing
majorities in swing vote cases is statistically significant, as is Justice
Stevens's presence in swing vote minorities. Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor and Scalia, moreover, all voted more often with swing vote
majorities than past mathematical predictions of their scores indi-
cated. Regression Table 10, in short, demonstrates that decisional
power in close cases shifted to ideological conservatives in 1995. Only
time (and perhaps a new appointment to the Court) will tell whether
this shift will be as short-lived as others tracked on Figure 10.
The only correlation noted on Regression Table 10 is between the
voting patterns of Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice, who were
linked about 74% of the time. Although Justice O'Connor voted in an
almost identical manner with the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia this
Term, her voting pattern over the course of this Study has not shown
significant correlation with their voting patterns.135
The predicted scores on Regression Table 10, finally, confirm Jus-
tice Kennedy's central position on the current Court. Justice Ken-
nedy's predicted and actual scores on Regression Table 10 were
exceptionally close (within a point). Justice Kennedy, furthermore,
has topped Table 10 as the most influential swing voter since the 1993
Term. 36 Because Justice Kennedy's predicted 1995 voting pattern,
which was calculated based upon trends established in terms domi-
nated by both liberal and conservative swing vote coalitions, was al-
most perfect, it seems clear that, at present, Justice Kennedy is the
proverbial "man in the middle." His vote, more than any other on the
Court, determines the outcome of the nation's closest cases.
V. Conclusion
The precise ideological position of the present Court is hard to
ascertain. Tables 1, 2, 4, 7 and 10 suggest that conservative Justices in
135. This example illustrates the possible hazard of confusing correlation among Jus-
tices' voting patterns over the course of the Study with correlation among their actual votes
In the current Term. The Regression Tables demonstrate correlation over time, not simple
coincidence of voting patterns within a single term.
136. See supra Table 10.
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1995 had the upper hand. Tables 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9 give some indication
to the contrary. However one reads the foregoing tables, it is indispu-
table that the Court, in close cases, remains seriously divided, with the
reins of power held by Justices Kennedy and O'Connor. This ideolog-
ical dynamic is unlikely to be resolved by a shifting of views within the
Court; Table 10 and Figure 10 indicate that new governing majorities
are unlikely to arise. Rather, as go Justices Kennedy and O'Connor,
so goes the Court. It would appear that this present trend will only be
altered by the resignation and replacement of one or more of the cur-
rent Justices.
Appendix A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those 1995 Term
cases decided by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been ex-
cluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by sum-
mary disposition are included only if they are accompanied by a full
opinion of the Court and not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases
decided by a four-four vote resulting in affirmance without written
opinion have been excluded. Both signed and per curiam opinions are
considered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than per-
functory manner. Cases not fitting within any of these categories are
not included in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Generally, the nature of the case is clearly
identified in the opinion. Only occasionally does a case pose a prob-
lem of classification. No cases in 1995 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Tables 1 through 4
Cases are included on Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily
true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these tables if
they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity might be
the United States government or one of its agencies or officials, or,
with respect to a state government, one of its political subdivisions. A
suit against a government official in a personal capacity is included if
that official is represented by government attorneys, or if the interests
of the government are otherwise clearly implicated. In instances of
multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if governmental entities ap-
pear on both sides of the controversy. If both a state and a federal
entity are parties to the same suit on the same side with only private
parties on the other, the case is included on Tables 1 and 2. A case is
included more than once on the same table if it raises two or more
distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are re-
solved by different voting alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Tables 5 through 9 for
which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written opinion.
One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A case is also
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included more than once on the same table if it raises two or more
distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the case and
the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A case is not
included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants is not
addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press, associa-
tion, and free exercise of religion are included. However, Establish-
ment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of religious
establishment is often made against another party's claim of free exer-
cise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of individ-
ual rights.
Statutory civil rights cases included on Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or physical
handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the
substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute, or if the issue
involves the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case at hand. How-
ever, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right
asserted is based on the United States Constitution and the issue re-
lates to that constitutional right. The purpose of this exclusion is to
preserve a distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional
claims.
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not
only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripeness, absten-
tion, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions
are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of
the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may com-
ment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Table 9 are limited to those cases in which
there were issues raised by conflicting actions of federal and state or
local governments. Common examples of these issues are preemp-
tion, inter-governmental immunities, application of the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government action, and
federal court interference with state court activities (other than review
of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or inter-
state relationships, such as those raised by the dormant Commerce
Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, are excluded from the
table.
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5. The Swing Vote Cases
Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a single
vote. This category also includes five-four decisions and four-three
decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions that re-
verse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-three or
four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from the major-
ity to the minority position would still result in affirmance by a tie
vote. A case is included more than once in the table if it raises two or
more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case and the issues
are resolved by different voting alignments.
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Appendix B
1. Student's t Testing 37
The purpose of this test is to determine whether this Term's score
(X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean of all
previous terms' scores (X1). Essentially, we treat these two numbers
as the means of two independent samples drawn from the universe of
all scores in the category.13  We hypothesize thatiX1 is also the true
mean of the population pt, and we set up this hypothesis (the "null"
hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as follows:
Ho: gx =x 1
The "null" hypothesis, i.e.,X 2 does not shift 1i from its previous
value on the real number line. Therefore, the two samples are
statistically equivalent.
Ha: 9 # X1
The alternative hypothesis, i.e.,X 2 shifts i from its previous value
on the real number line. Therefore, the two samples are not
statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a cer-
tain confidence interval,139 by rejecting the null hypothesis.140 This is
accomplished by calculating the following statistic:
t_ X2-4I
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-distribu-
tion table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (a) and the
appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k).' a ' If the absolute
value of t is greater than the table entry, Ho is rejected and we say that
the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in voting behav-
ior this Term.
137. For a practical perspective on this procedure, see DAVID S. MOORE AND GEORGE
P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACFiCE OF STATISTICS 500-18 (1993). See also,
HOGG AND CRAIG, supra note 33.
138. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
139. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test
(X2 may shift g. in either a positive or negative direction), a = .025.
140. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is be-
yond the scope of this Article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha) error.
For a complete explanation, see MOORE & MCCABE, supra note 137.
141. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, i is the only hypothesized pa-
rameter, so k = 1.
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2. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model. 142 This model is useful
in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's
score) is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with
no other explanatory variables. ARIMA is an empirical (rather than
theoretical), highly refined, curve-fitting procedure.
3. Correlation and Regression Analysis
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 11 and
12. Figure 11 shows a high degree of positive correlation (+.944) be-
tween the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia for
the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an upward
sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 12 shows that the voting per-
centages of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens show a very weak,
negative correlation (-.140). The points are widely scattered about a
downward-sloping line. Statistically significant correlations between
and among Justices are shown in Regression Tables 1 through 10. The
first and second columns of these tables list the Justices showing corre-
lations and their corresponding correlation coefficient. The third col-
unm contains the associated regression line equation(s). The vertical
distance between the actual points and the regression line represent
that portion of the relationship between the Justices' voting patterns
which is unexplained by the regression equation. In this Study, we say
that voting patterns are "linked" to the extent that the regression
equation does explain the relationship. The degree to which the rela-
tionship is explained is represented by the adjusted r2 statistic in the
fourth column.
Linear regression is, in its simplest form, an attempt to estimate
accurately the true values of the slope between two or more variables.
However, one crucial difference between simple correlation and re-
gression is the presumption of causation. A linear regression model is
one that attempts to use one or more explanatory, or independent,
variables to explain the variance in one dependant variable. Most lin-
ear regression computer results test the hypothesis that the estimated
parameters, or 3s, are equivalent to 0. The analyst actually typically
142. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p,d,q)
model, see PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONomTIcs 248-49 (1992). See also CAS-
stay, supra note 104.
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Figure 11
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desires that such a result not occur-in other words, he or she wants
the data to summarily reject the statistical test of this hypothesis,
thereby proving the alternate hypothesis that the 3s are not equivalent
to 0. It is important to remember, though, that neither a rejection of
the null hypothesis that 13 equals 0 or a high r2 (adjusted) statistic 43 as
listed in the fourth column of the table imply causation. Justice
Scalia's voting record might correlate quite highly with that of Justice
Stevens's on equal protection questions. That does not, however, im-
ply that Justice Scalia causes Justice Stevens to vote the way he does
or vice versa.
There are five assumptions necessary for a valid classical regres-
sion model:
1) The dependant variable may be calculated as a linear func-
tion of one or more independent variables.
2) The mean value of the disturbance term e (the difference be-
tween observed and expected dependant variable values) is
0.
3) The variance of the disturbance term is constant
(homoskedasticity).
4) Observations of independent variables are fixed with regard
to repeated sampling.
5) The number of observations is greater than the number of
independent variables, and there are no linear relationships
between independent variables (multicollinearity).
The modeling completed in this Study failed to meet the second, third,
fourth, and fifth assumptions of classical linear regression. However,
results were usually accurate enough to assume some degree of ro-
bustness with regard to assumptional departures, at least from an em-
pirical perspective.
143. The r2 statistic is an estimate of p2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s). The "adjusted" r' value in the ta-
bles is a result of the computer's attempts to filter out any bias in the original rl result.
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